arXiv:2607. 26820v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) evolve from standalone assistants into autonomous agents, ensuring their safety requires shifting beyond pointwise risk assessment to understand how risks emerge and unfold over long-horizon trajectories.
arXiv:2606. 07054v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents can pursue hidden malicious objectives through sequences of individually benign actions, making sabotage difficult to detect using standard trajectory-level monitoring.
arXiv:2606. 00611v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-horizon LLM agents produce safety evidence across long trajectories, where sparse, delayed, and compositional risk signals often escape local moderation.
arXiv:2606. 09890v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents capable of executing multi-step action trajectories toward a given objective.
HINTBench is a new benchmark for evaluating agents’ intrinsic risk, comprising 596 trajectories (400 synthetic risky, 136 synthetic safe, 30 real risky, 30 real safe) with an average length of 24 steps. It supports three tasks—risk detection, risk-step localization, and intrinsic failure-type identification—using a unified five-constraint taxonomy. Experiments show a large performance gap: while large language models can detect risky trajectories, they score below 37 on strict-F1 for risk-step localization, and existing guard models transfer poorly to this setting.
arXiv:2604. 02022v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Evaluating the safety of LLM-based agents is increasingly important because risks in realistic deployments often emerge over multi-step interactions rather than isolated prompts or final responses.
arXiv:2608. 05695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly invoke external tools and interact with real-world systems, unsafe actions may cause irreversible consequences on external states, user data, and downstream services.
arXiv:2609.06783v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents operate in workflows where unsafe actions can have real consequences. Existing safety evaluations often reduce behavior to a single score,...
PASTABench introduces a benchmark of 1,139 multi-turn trajectories to evaluate proactive safety monitoring in large language models. It formalizes three dimensions of intervention—whether, when, and what risk—to address gaps in step-level isolation and post-hoc trajectory assessment. The study finds that proactive intervention is largely unsolved, with the best model achieving only 40.74% optimal-timing interventions, and reveals that smaller models’ safety scores are often driven by lexical overfitting rather than true risk comprehension.
arXiv:2607. 19913v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent safety is moving from content moderation toward preventing operational failures before tool-using agents act.
The paper introduces a method for monitoring web agents without relying on internal signals such as token logits. It proposes two observable trajectory representations—Macro features that capture cross‑step agent–environment interactions, and Micro features that assess consistency of intention, action, and expected state change via repeated black‑box queries. By labeling the first uncorrected critical error that leads to final failure as a key‑step boundary, the approach preserves valid early prefixes of failed trajectories and achieves risk prediction performance competitive with internal‑signal baselines across WebArena‑Lite and Online Mind2Web benchmarks.
arXiv:2608. 09885v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The safety of large language model (LLM) agents depends not only on model weights but also on the agent harness that manages context, memory, tools, permissions, and runtime control.