arXiv:2608. 05695v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language model (LLM) agents increasingly invoke external tools and interact with real-world systems, unsafe actions may cause irreversible consequences on external states, user data, and downstream services.
By Wenhao Lin, Chenyu Yu, Xingwei Lin, Sicong Cao, Xiang Chen, Lei Xue, Le Yu, Letian Sha, Chunming Wu
arXiv:2607. 26820v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) evolve from standalone assistants into autonomous agents, ensuring their safety requires shifting beyond pointwise risk assessment to understand how risks emerge and unfold over long-horizon trajectories.
By Shi Lin, Peng Qian, Dinghao Liu, Renjie Sun, Sifan Wu, Dezhang Kong, Chenpei Wang, Xun Wang
arXiv:2606. 02423v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can serve as helpful assistants, yet they can equally function as harm amplifiers that enable malicious users to achieve harmful outcomes beyond their capabilities through extended interactions.
By Ruohao Guo, Wei Xu, Alan Ritter
arXiv:2606. 05614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content.
By Long P. Hoang, Hai V. Le, Shaoyang Xu, Wei Lu, Wenxuan Zhang
arXiv:2509. 05367v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Model safety alignment predominantly operates on a binary assumption that requests are either safe or unsafe.
By Shei Pern Chua, Zhen Leng Thai, Kai Jun Teh, Xiao Li, Qibing Ren, Xiaolin Hu
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2606. 05805v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM-based guardrails typically safeguard agents by evaluating proposed actions or inputs before execution, producing safety signals such as binary allow/deny decisions, risk categories, and/or explanatory rationales about potential policy violations.
By Yuhao Sun, Jiacheng Zhang, Shaanan Cohney, Zhexin Zhang, Feng Liu, Xingliang Yuan
arXiv:2606. 08531v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evolving from simple text-based interaction systems into LLM agents that can maintain memory, use tools, access external environments, and execute tasks.
By Lu Jia, Haibo Tong, Feifei Zhao, Jindong Li, Dongqi Liang, Ping Wu, Qian Zhang, Yi Zeng
arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.
By Katharina Deckenbach, Haritz Puerto, Jonas Geiping, Sahar Abdelnabi
arXiv:2606. 07054v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents can pursue hidden malicious objectives through sequences of individually benign actions, making sabotage difficult to detect using standard trajectory-level monitoring.
By Vijitha Mittapalli, Shreyaa Jayant Dani, Satya Srujana Pilli, Snigdha Ansu, Mohammadreza Teymoorianfard, Franck Dernoncourt, Hongjie Chen, Yu Wang, Ryan A. Rossi, Nesreen K. Ahmed
arXiv:2608. 14590v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform irreversible real-world actions, including database updates, API calls, file operations, and autonomous use of tools.
By Pierre Dantas, Lucas Cordeiro, Ehsan Nowroozi, Tihanyi Norbert
arXiv:2604. 07223v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) evolve from static chatbots into autonomous agents, the primary vulnerability surface shifts from final outputs to intermediate execution traces.
By Yen-Shan Chen, Sian-Yao Huang, Cheng-Lin Yang, Yun-Nung Chen