arXiv AI By Jiacheng Wang, Jinchang Hou, Fabian Wang, Ping Jian, Chenfu Bao, Zhonghou Lv

HINTBench: Horizon-agent Intrinsic Non-attack Trajectory Benchmark

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HINTBench is a new benchmark for evaluating agents’ intrinsic risk, comprising 596 trajectories (400 synthetic risky, 136 synthetic safe, 30 real risky, 30 real safe) with an average length of 24 steps. It supports three tasks—risk detection, risk-step localization, and intrinsic failure-type identification—using a unified five-constraint taxonomy. Experiments show a large performance gap: while large language models can detect risky trajectories, they score below 37 on strict-F1 for risk-step localization, and existing guard models transfer poorly to this setting.

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