arXiv:2606. 05625v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Implicit reward hacking is hard to audit when a language model's chain of thought appears benign: a final answer may be anchored by a prompt shortcut while the written reasoning still resembles ordinary problem solving.
arXiv:2604. 23488v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reward hacking in code generation, where models exploit evaluation loopholes to obtain high reward without correctly solving the intended task, poses a critical challenge for Reinforcement Learning (RL) and the deployment of reasoning models.
arXiv:2604. 23488v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reward hacking in code generation, where models exploit evaluation loopholes to obtain high reward without correctly solving the intended task, poses a critical challenge for Reinforcement Learning (RL) and the deployment of reasoning models.
arXiv:2608. 02657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.
arXiv:2606. 26300v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A classical intuition holds that verifying a solution is easier than producing one.
arXiv:2607. 04572v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language model (LLM) tutors may have access to teacher notes, answer keys, rubrics, or retrieved solutions while producing student-facing explanations.
arXiv:2604. 01476v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reinforcement learning for LLMs is vulnerable to reward hacking, where models exploit shortcuts to maximize reward without solving the intended task.
arXiv:2606. 20470v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI systems increasingly rely on language-model components to interpret instructions, process external data, invoke tools, and coordinate with other agents.
arXiv:2608. 05687v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Masked diffusion language models (dLLMs) can commit tokens in any order -- a freedom marketed as their core advantage over autoregressive decoding.
arXiv:2606. 12016v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Model post-training, and in particular reinforcement learning (RL), is one of the primary mechanisms by which developers can shape models' values and behaviors.
arXiv:2607. 16451v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Chat models sometimes commit to an answer and then produce reasoning that justifies it rather than deriving it -- even when the answer contradicts a task premise.
arXiv:2605. 21706v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Safety-aligned language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet refusal behavior can be suppressed by steering their internal representations.
arXiv:2607. 04572v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) tutors often produce fluent step-by-step explanations, but a correct and pedagogically formatted response does not guarantee that the answer was derived from the student-facing problem.