arXiv AI

Hack-Verifiable Terminal Bench: Evaluating Reward Hacking in Terminal Tasks

arXiv Machine Learning
Aug 4

Do Prompt-Elicited Trajectories Reflect Training-Time Reward Hacking? A Systematic Study on Monitoring Training-Time Reward Hacking in Code Generation

arXiv:2604. 23488v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reward hacking in code generation, where models exploit evaluation loopholes to obtain high reward without correctly solving the intended task, poses a critical challenge for Reinforcement Learning (RL) and the deployment of reasoning models.

By Lichen Li, Hengguang Zhou, Yijun Liang, Tianyi Zhou, Cho-Jui Hsieh
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 25

Do Prompt-Elicited Trajectories Reflect Training-Time Reward Hacking? A Systematic Study on Monitoring Trainig-Time Reward Hacking in Code Generation

arXiv:2604. 23488v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Reward hacking in code generation, where models exploit evaluation loopholes to obtain high reward without correctly solving the intended task, poses a critical challenge for Reinforcement Learning (RL) and the deployment of reasoning models.

By Lichen Li, Hengguang Zhou, Yijun Liang, Tianyi Zhou, Cho-Jui Hsieh
arXiv Computation and Language
Aug 25

Detecting and Suppressing Reward Hacking with Gradient Fingerprints

The paper introduces Gradient Fingerprint (GRIFT), a technique that uses a model’s internal gradient computations to detect reward hacking in reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. GRIFT compresses gradients of a chain-of-thought (CoT) conditioned on a prompt into a compact representation, which is then used to assess whether the CoT reflects reward hacking. Experiments on math, code, and logical reasoning benchmarks show GRIFT outperforms baselines by over 25% and, when integrated into a rejection fine‑tuning pipeline, reduces reward hacking while improving task performance.

By Songtao Wang, Quang Hieu Pham, Fangcong Yin, Xinpeng Wang, Jocelyn Qiaochu Chen, Greg Durrett, Xi Ye
arXiv AI
Jun 12

PI-Hunter: Automated Red-Teaming for Exposing and Localizing Prompt Injections

arXiv:2606. 12737v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into agentic systems that interact with external tools and environments, introducing new security risks such as indirect prompt injection attacks through untrusted external sources.

By Pengfei He, Lesly Miculicich, Vishesh Sharma, Ash Fox, George Lee, Jiliang Tang, Tomas Pfister, Long T. Le