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arXiv AI By Jianshuo Dong, Yiming Liu, Maosen Zhang, Nan Deng, Peng Xu, Xiaoping Zhang, Tianwei Zhang, Jie Zhang, Han Qiu

Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden States

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