The paper audits self‑evolving financial agents—SkillOpt, Agent Workflow Memory (AWM), and ReasoningBank—by evaluating their performance, security drift, and execution‑interface mismatches in simulated e‑banking scenarios. It shows that while utility improves after evolution, exposure to malicious content and unauthorized state changes also rise, and that AWM’s text‑action envelope can disrupt tool execution, highlighting the need for comprehensive auditing beyond accuracy metrics.
By Jialong Li, Jialing Zhu
arXiv:2607. 00871v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Self-evolving agents violate the assumption behind most learning-theoretic guarantees: the data, evaluator, components, and hypothesis space are produced by the policy being updated.
By Biswa Sengupta
EvolveTrade is a self‑evolving framework that treats the system prompt of a tool‑using LLM trading agent as a text‑parameterized policy. After each update interval, a Policy Agent revises this policy using accumulated decision traces and portfolio feedback while keeping the backbone LLM fixed, allowing the agent to refine its information‑acquisition and portfolio‑construction procedures over time. Experiments across multiple market regimes and two LLM backbones show that EvolveTrade often improves Sharpe Ratio and Cumulative Return over fixed‑policy baselines, with behavioral analyses indicating increased code‑mediated analysis and regime‑relevant computations.
By Sehee Kim, Yumin Choi, Minki Kang, Sung Ju Hwang
PerMIT is a memory architecture that provides provable integrity guarantees for persistent memory used by large language model agents. It limits trust to user‑typed inputs and values confirmed at a gate, mediating untrusted environment‑derived values through a finite interface while preserving multi‑turn planning and tool choice. Two machine‑checked integrity theorems in Lean 4 ensure that only gate‑confirmed data can influence sensitive actions, and community endorsements can accumulate to reduce verification effort as the user base grows.
By Tanqiu Jiang, Min Bai, Sadat Shahriar, Wanyu Du, Sandesh Swamy
arXiv:2609.07065v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Agent-to-agent (A2A) alpha discovery is slowed by repeated feedback cycles between mining and evaluation agents, whose hand-offs, in contemporary LLM m...
By Yuqi Li, Siyuan Liu, Bingjun Liu
The paper investigates how adversarial signals can infiltrate large‑language‑model (LLM) based multi‑agent trading systems through the agents’ communication channels. By restricting the attacker to realistic inputs—source data and prompts—it studies role‑specific attacks on four functional roles (Analyst, Researcher, Trader, Risk Manager) and evaluates four communication topologies under data‑ and agent‑level attacks. Experiments across multiple assets, backbones, and target directions show that no architecture is inherently robust, highlighting the need for safer designs in agentic trading systems.
By CheolWon Na, Hao Ni, Lukasz Szpruch, Zhangyang Wang, Dhagash Mehta, Saurabh Nagrecha, Alejandro Lopez-Lira, Chanyeol Choi, Yongjae Lee, Jee-Hyong Lee
arXiv:2607. 04613v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous agents are moving from sandboxed text generators to operators of code, data, and physical infrastructure, and they increasingly learn while deployed.
By Xue Qin, Simin Luan, Cong Yang, Zhijun Li
arXiv:2607.10526v5 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Self-improving personal agents write profiles, memories, and reusable skills that carry over from one chat to the next. Prior works ask whether a m...
By Xutao Mao, Liangjie Zhao, Leyao Wang, Rui Qian, Qiang Huang, Wentao Wang, Bo Han, Xiang Zheng, Cong Wang
arXiv:2606. 00914v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts.
By Rana Muhammad Usman
arXiv:2608. 13120v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agent Skills are today either hand-authored or produced in a single LLM generation pass, and consequently possess no closed loop through which they might improve from the interaction failures they actually cause.
By Qianxi Yan, Chunrong Chen, Jiuzhou Zhao, Min Zhang, Yongzhou Xu, Xiaochuan Xu
arXiv:2606. 02528v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models now power robo-advisors and trading agents, yet whether they carry built-in biases toward specific assets is largely untested.
By Wenbin Wu
arXiv:2606. 08539v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly take consequential actions -- shell commands, cloud operations, and arbitrary tool-calls -- so a trust layer must decide, per action, whether to allow, warn, block, or escalate.
By Chenglin Yang