arXiv:2607. 00871v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Self-evolving agents violate the assumption behind most learning-theoretic guarantees: the data, evaluator, components, and hypothesis space are produced by the policy being updated.
arXiv:2607. 13070v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety claims for self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, a promise in a README.
arXiv:2607. 13070v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety claims on self-improving agent runtimes are almost always self-graded: a policy file, a guardrail, or a README commitment.
arXiv:2606. 19808v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Test-time reasoning is increasingly used as a serving-time control knob, but extra reasoning is not uniformly valuable: it can repair failed attempts, waste compute on already-correct answers, or introduce harmful answer changes.
arXiv:2607. 25152v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-running autonomous agents plan, act, and judge their own completion without human intervention.
arXiv:2608. 08466v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern LLM agents are often improved by modifying prompts, tools, or workflows manually, while the executable scaffold surrounding the model---the \emph{harness}---is typically treated as a fixed artifact after deployment.
arXiv:2607. 14408v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A self-evolving agentic loop repeatedly proposes a tweaked version of an agent (its prompt template or program) and accepts or rejects the change based on a per-iteration quality signal.
arXiv:2606. 08106v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Self-evolving agents improve by repeatedly proposing changes to their own prompts, skills, or workflows and keeping those that score higher on a small held-out set.
arXiv:2607. 29400v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A routing decision can be revised at the next transaction, but a latched source exclusion persists across later decisions.
arXiv:2606. 29713v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Hallucination is the reliability bottleneck for LLM-based agents, and fact attribution verifiers are the last line of defense -- yet today's verifiers emit only opaque binary labels, leaving agents unable to self-correct and operators unable to audit.
arXiv:2606. 11688v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Long-horizon LLM agents are not trusted to run unattended: with no human watching, they confidently report success they never verified.
arXiv:2606. 10241v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Autonomous improvement loops are hard to trust because the improvement process is usually external scaffolding bolted onto the agent: failures go unlogged, diagnoses cannot be replayed, and promote-or-discard decisions land in a side database rather than the agent's own history.
arXiv:2608. 07545v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: An LLM agent's capability depends not only on model weights but on its harness: prompts, tools, skills, and control flow.