The paper introduces response manipulation attacks (ReMA) that iteratively optimize malicious agent responses to compromise multi‑agent system outputs. It proposes SecMAS, a secure aggregation rule that selects responses most consistent with a large subset of others, providing theoretical security guarantees against both untargeted and targeted attacks. Experiments show existing aggregation rules are vulnerable to ReMA, while SecMAS defends effectively without sacrificing utility.
By Xilong Wang, Xiaoxing Chen, Neil Gong
The use of agentic systems to perform offensive security operations has moved from a theoretical possibility to a commoditized capability. However, while the community has focused on creating more and more capable agents, less attention has been allocated to assessing the security of those systems.
arXiv:2606. 24496v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The use of agentic systems to perform offensive security operations has moved from a theoretical possibility to a commoditized capability.
By Dario Pasquini, Michal Bazyli, Taras Fedynyshyn, Artem Sorokin
arXiv:2606. 02302v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents increasingly operate in stateful environments where they access tools, files, memory, and external services.
By Hao Cheng, Changtao Miao, Tianle Song, Yin Wu, He Liu, Erjia Xiao, Junchi Chen, Xiaoyu Shi, Yichi Wang, Jing Yang, Taowen Wang, Jinhao Duan, Mengshu Sun, Peiyan Dong, Xuan Shen, Yang Cao, Renjing Xu, Kaidi Xu, Jindong Gu, Bo Zhang, Jize Zhang, Chenhao Lin, Philip Torr, Chao Shen
arXiv:2508. 16481v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Ensuring the safe use of agentic systems requires a thorough understanding of the range of malicious behaviors these systems may exhibit.
By Jonathan N\"other, Adish Singla, Goran Radanovic
arXiv:2609.00595v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Safe agents can fail together. Multi-agent LLM systems (MAS) move information, state, decisions, and authority across principal boundaries, creating...
By Rui Yang, Junjie Xu, Zhengyu Liu, Neil Fendley, Yang Hong, Ziyang Li, Yinzhi Cao
MiniRep is a reputation‑based aggregation system designed for multi‑agent debate (MAD) that remains robust even when malicious agents are present. It evaluates agents on both their current task performance and historical reputation, while preventing groups of agents with highly similar responses from dominating the final decision. Experiments on the MATH benchmark show that MiniRep consistently outperforms conventional MAD aggregation and other reputation‑based approaches across a wide range of attack scenarios.
By Jiaming Zhang, Yuwan Liu, Yue Huang, Sisi Duan
arXiv:2602. 09222v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) based web agents are increasingly deployed to automate complex online tasks by directly interacting with web sites and performing actions on users' behalf.
By Georgios Syros, Evan Rose, Brian Grinstead, Christoph Kerschbaumer, William Robertson, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Alina Oprea
arXiv:2607. 06807v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: While enabling effective collaboration on complex tasks, LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) face critical security challenges due to vulnerabilities at the agent and interaction levels.
By Haowen Xu, Xue Tan, Lei Ma, Zhihao Zhang, Chao Wang, Qingze Wang, Ping Chen, Jun Dai, Xiaoyan Sun
arXiv:2606.17092v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Agentic systems are increasingly integrated with geographic information systems (GIS), where multi-agent coordination enables complex convers...
By Kyle Gao, Pranavi Kotta, Linlin Xu, Jonathan Li, David A. Clausi
The paper introduces ReMAS, a reinforcement learning-based framework for black-box red-teaming of multi-agent systems (MAS) that fine-tunes attacker LLMs to craft adversarial prompts. ReMAS operates in two stages: a rewrite stage that refines base attack prompts to boost extraction success, and a template generation stage that builds attack templates to better invoke specific sub-agents and expose their system prompts. Experiments demonstrate that ReMAS significantly outperforms existing black-box attacks, showing high success rates and transferability across different backend LLMs and MAS structures.
By Yuqi Jia, Hangsheng Zhang, Chenxi Liu, Junjie Liang, Xun Chen
Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense.