Red-Teaming the Agentic Red-Team
arXiv:2606. 24496v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The use of agentic systems to perform offensive security operations has moved from a theoretical possibility to a commoditized capability.
The use of agentic systems to perform offensive security operations has moved from a theoretical possibility to a commoditized capability. However, while the community has focused on creating more and more capable agents, less attention has been allocated to assessing the security of those systems.
arXiv:2606. 24496v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The use of agentic systems to perform offensive security operations has moved from a theoretical possibility to a commoditized capability.
arXiv:2510. 06445v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are now used throughout cybersecurity.
arXiv:2509. 25624v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As LLMs advance into autonomous agents with tool-use capabilities, they introduce security challenges that extend beyond traditional content-based LLM safety concerns.
arXiv:2606. 02302v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents increasingly operate in stateful environments where they access tools, files, memory, and external services.
arXiv:2608. 12977v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The expanding operational capabilities of large language model (LLM) agents introduce sophisticated security threats.
arXiv:2606. 10749v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly moving from conversational interfaces to software components that plan, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act on external environments.
arXiv:2606. 30755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Claw-like AI agents (e.
arXiv:2606. 13079v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Nowadays, the autonomous execution of cyberattacks capable of causing substantial real-world harm is widely regarded as one of the critical red lines that frontier AI systems must not cross.
arXiv:2606. 09549v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene.
arXiv:2603. 05786v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI agents become widely deployed as online services, users often rely on an agent developer's claim about how safety is enforced, which introduces a threat where safety measures are falsely advertised.
arXiv:2607. 25379v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cyber-capable AI agents combine language models with tools, memory, and execution en- vironments to perform multi-step offensive-security tasks.
arXiv:2607. 01919v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic systems enhance their capabilities by invoking external tools and maintaining persistent memory.