arXiv AI

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

arXiv:2602. 09222v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) based web agents are increasingly deployed to automate complex online tasks by directly interacting with web sites and performing actions on users' behalf.

arXiv AI
Jun 12

Who Pays the Price? Stakeholder-Centric Prompt Injection Benchmarking for Real-world Web Agents

arXiv:2606. 13385v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences.

By Zihao Wang, Yiming Li, Yutong Wu, Zheyu Liu, Kangjie Chen, Fok Kar Wai, Pin-Yu Chen, Vrizlynn L. L. Thing, Bo Li, Dacheng Tao, Tianwei Zhang
arXiv AI
Jun 12

PI-Hunter: Automated Red-Teaming for Exposing and Localizing Prompt Injections

arXiv:2606. 12737v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into agentic systems that interact with external tools and environments, introducing new security risks such as indirect prompt injection attacks through untrusted external sources.

By Pengfei He, Lesly Miculicich, Vishesh Sharma, Ash Fox, George Lee, Jiliang Tang, Tomas Pfister, Long T. Le
arXiv AI
Jun 4

What If Prompt Injection Never Left? Exploring Cross-Session Stored Prompt Injection in Agentic Systems

arXiv:2606. 04425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agentic systems transform LLMs from session-bounded assistants into stateful systems that persist and evolve shared world state across sessions through memories, filesystems, tools, and other long-lived contextual artifacts.

By Yuanbo Xie, Tianyun Liu, Yingjie Zhang, Suchen Liu, Yulin Li, Liya Su, Tingwen Liu
arXiv AI
Sep 24

WAInjectBench: Benchmarking Prompt Injection Detections for Web Agents

WAInjectBench introduces the first comprehensive benchmark for detecting prompt injection attacks against web agents, offering a fine‑grained categorization of threats and datasets that include malicious and benign text and image samples. The study systematically evaluates both text‑based and image‑based detection methods across multiple scenarios, revealing that detectors perform well on attacks with explicit instructions or visible perturbations but struggle with subtle or instruction‑free attacks. The authors release the datasets and code to facilitate further research in this area.

By Yinuo Liu, Xilong Wang, Ruohan Xu, Yuqi Jia, Neil Zhenqiang Gong
arXiv AI
Sep 7

Repeat-After-Me: Black-Box Adaptive Visual Prompt Injection

Repeat-After-Me is a black-box adaptive visual prompt injection technique that can reveal personally identifiable information or trigger malicious tool calls in both open-weight and commercial vision‑language models, achieving attack success rates above 80% on Qwen3.6‑27B and 47% on GPT‑5.5. The method works even when the benign user prompt is unrelated to the injected task and does not explicitly authorize it, and it retains significant effectiveness when transferred across models or optimized on surrogate systems. In a real‑world OpenClaw Discord deployment, a minimally injected image can overwrite TOOLS.md, enabling remote code execution and secret exfiltration.

By Sizhe Chen, Yu-Lin Tsai, Ivan Evtimov, Kamalika Chaudhuri, Raluca Ada Popa, David Wagner, Arman Zharmagambetov
arXiv AI
Aug 26

WebMCP-Phalanx: Enforcing and Characterizing Trust Boundaries for Browser-Integrated LLM Agents

WebMCP-Phalanx introduces a dual‑layer runtime for browser‑integrated LLM agents that enforces trust boundaries on web‑exposed tools. The first layer uses cryptographic capability credentials to bind tools to their registering principals and propagate provenance labels, while the second layer separates semantic inspection from privileged tool use via a Quarantine Agent that validates tool metadata before a Privileged Agent can execute it. Empirical results show the approach eliminates revocation and overwrite attacks, blocks most prompt‑injection attempts, and maintains task utility comparable to a no‑attack baseline.

By Lin-Fa Lee, YI-YU Chang, Kuo-Hui Yeh