arXiv:2606. 24496v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The use of agentic systems to perform offensive security operations has moved from a theoretical possibility to a commoditized capability.
The use of agentic systems to perform offensive security operations has moved from a theoretical possibility to a commoditized capability. However, while the community has focused on creating more and more capable agents, less attention has been allocated to assessing the security of those systems.
arXiv:2510. 06445v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are now used throughout cybersecurity.
arXiv:2509. 25624v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As LLMs advance into autonomous agents with tool-use capabilities, they introduce security challenges that extend beyond traditional content-based LLM safety concerns.
arXiv:2606. 02302v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Autonomous LLM agents increasingly operate in stateful environments where they access tools, files, memory, and external services.
arXiv:2609.00595v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safe agents can fail together. Multi-agent LLM systems (MAS) move information, state, decisions, and authority across principal boundaries, creating...
arXiv:2606. 09549v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents face two distinct security failures: unauthorized external actions and exposure of sensitive plaintext inside the runtime before any final output check can intervene.
arXiv:2606. 30755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Claw-like AI agents (e.
arXiv:2608. 12977v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The expanding operational capabilities of large language model (LLM) agents introduce sophisticated security threats.
arXiv:2606. 10749v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly moving from conversational interfaces to software components that plan, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act on external environments.
arXiv:2601.12449v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper t...
The paper introduces ShadowMem, a defensive framework that protects large language model agents from long-horizon threats by maintaining a dedicated safety-focused memory. Inspired by the shadow stack concept, ShadowMem stores safety-critical context throughout an agent’s execution and uses this shadow memory to evaluate the risk of upcoming actions before they are carried out. Experiments show that ShadowMem outperforms existing defenses in detection accuracy, detects most attacks early, and adds minimal overhead to agent performance.
ActGov is a runtime enforcement framework that validates each action proposed by a large language model (LLM) agent before it interacts with external tools, ensuring that actions stay within task‑scoped authorization boundaries and comply with dynamically constructed policies. It builds policies from tool specifications, benign tasks, and failure traces, verifying updates via SMT‑based counterexample checking. In evaluations on AgentDojo and AgentDyn benchmarks, ActGov consistently reduces indirect prompt‑injection attack success while maintaining task utility, outperforming existing defenses.