MADBench is a benchmark that evaluates the security of Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) systems, which allow large language models to exchange and critique answers. The study categorizes attacks into a layered taxonomy aligned with the MAD workflow and tests six attack families across 356 source tasks and 3,958 test cases. Results indicate that while MAD can reduce answer accuracy attacks compared to single-agent baselines, it may amplify unauthorized reads or writes, and even with collusion among agents, the final answer changes from correct to wrong only 28.30% of the time.
By Yuwan Liu, Jiaming Zhang, Yue Huang, Sisi Duan
arXiv:2606. 13385v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences.
By Zihao Wang, Yiming Li, Yutong Wu, Zheyu Liu, Kangjie Chen, Fok Kar Wai, Pin-Yu Chen, Vrizlynn L. L. Thing, Bo Li, Dacheng Tao, Tianwei Zhang
arXiv:2510. 20963v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Multi-agent debate (MAD) was proposed as a promising approach for ensembling the wisdom of multiple large language models (LLMs) to improve reasoning and provide effective supervision to superhuman LLMs.
By Yongqiang Chen, Gang Niu, James Cheng, Bo Han, Masashi Sugiyama
POIROT (Phased Oversight via Introspection, Review and Opinion Tallying) is a modular protocol that lets agents in large language model multi‑agent systems attribute failures to themselves by casting private votes in a hazard space and aggregating those votes. The protocol progresses through phases—from independent self‑assessment to shared assessments and peer interrogation—to evaluate the contribution of each phase. Experiments on the Who&When benchmark and the newly released BLAME benchmark show that agent‑based attribution, especially the independent self‑assessment phase, outperforms a single‑LLM evaluator across multiple models and benchmarks.
By I\~naki Dellibarda Varela, R. Sendra-Arranz, Pablo Romero-Sorozabal, J. M. Valverde-Garc\'ia, Annemarie F. Laudanski, \'Alvaro Guti\'errez, Eduardo Rocon, Manuel Cebrian
arXiv:2501. 00745v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The increasing integration of Large Language Model (LLM) based search engines has transformed the landscape of information retrieval.
By Xiyang Hu
The paper introduces response manipulation attacks (ReMA) that iteratively optimize malicious agent responses to compromise multi‑agent system outputs. It proposes SecMAS, a secure aggregation rule that selects responses most consistent with a large subset of others, providing theoretical security guarantees against both untargeted and targeted attacks. Experiments show existing aggregation rules are vulnerable to ReMA, while SecMAS defends effectively without sacrificing utility.
By Xilong Wang, Xiaoxing Chen, Neil Gong