arXiv AI

Sequential LLM Release Facilitates Manipulation in Regulated Markets

arXiv:2601. 11496v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: AI agents increasingly mediate bargaining, negotiation and persuasion for people and firms.

arXiv AI
Jun 9

Payoff scaling shapes cooperation in LLM agents across languages

arXiv:2601. 19082v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents that negotiate, coordinate, and act on behalf of users.

By Trung-Kiet Huynh, Dao-Sy Duy-Minh, Thanh-Bang Cao, Phong-Hao Le, Hong-Dan Nguyen, Phu-Quy Nguyen-Lam, Minh-Luan Nguyen-Vo, Hong-Phat Pham, Phu-Hoa Pham, Thien-Kim Than, Chi-Nguyen Tran, Huy Tran, Gia-Thoai Tran-Le, Alessio Buscemi, Le Hong Trang, The Anh Han
arXiv AI
1d ago

Emergent Misaligned Communication in Long-Horizon Multi-Agent LLM Commerce

arXiv:2608. 14825v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier LLM agents increasingly transact on behalf of separate principals, often using natural language rather than structured APIs.

By Zeyuan Li (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Lukas Petersson (Andon Labs), Alessandro Acquisti (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Michiel A. Bakker (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
arXiv AI
Jun 9

Beyond Agent Architecture: Execution Assumptions and Reproducibility in LLM-Based Trading Systems

arXiv:2606. 08285v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) and agentic systems are increasingly proposed for financial trading, yet their reported performance remains difficult to compare because studies vary in data provenance, temporal split discipline, execution timing, turnover treatment, and transaction-cost modeling.

By Junyi Yao, Zihao Zheng
arXiv AI
Jul 14

Can Agentic Trading Systems Pay for Their Own Intelligence?

arXiv:2607. 10286v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used in trading systems, where model reasoning, tool use, and continual decisions incur costs that are expected to produce trading value.

By Qiqi Duan, Changlun Li, Chen Wang, Fan Zhang, Mengxiang Wang, Dayi Miao, Peixian Ma, Jiangpeng Yan, Liyuan Chen, Shuoling Liu, Preslav Nakov, Yuyu Luo, Nan Tang
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 8

Strategic Bargaining in Multi-Buyer Markets: Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards for LLM Negotiations

arXiv:2607. 05863v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Negotiation is a fundamental strategic interaction in management science, characterized by agents attempting to reach agreements while protecting private information, such as reservation costs and hidden valuations.

By Shuze Daniel Liu, Claire Chen, Jiabao Sean Xiao, Xin Chen, David Simchi-Levi