arXiv:2606. 31213v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as moral advisors and agents, they need to address dilemmas between two competing values.
arXiv:2606. 11635v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly.
arXiv:2603.23114v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A human's moral decision depends heavily on the context. Yet research on LLM morality has largely studied fixed scenarios. We address this gap by i...
The paper argues that AI alignment depends on a system’s ability to exhibit a coherent moral policy—stable, monotonic, decisive, and Pareto‑viable—rather than on any specific moral standard. The authors test nine large language models across varied moral scenarios and find that none maintain consistent verdicts, with surface‑form changes causing up to 99% shifts in outcomes. This indicates that current LLM agents lack the structural moral competence required for meaningful alignment.
arXiv:2603. 00048v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive applications including psychological support, healthcare, and high-stakes decision-making.
arXiv:2608. 14522v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems make more morally loaded decisions across society, one response has been moral preference elicitation.
arXiv:2510. 16380v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us.
The paper introduces the concept of "narrative captivity," a failure mode where large language models (LLMs) accept an unchallenged, one-sided narrative as complete and align with the narrator’s interpretation during multi‑turn moral consultations. Using a benchmark of 5,078 interpersonal‑conflict scenarios across six moral dimensions, the authors find that narrative captivity is widespread across 17 LLMs, with end‑state judgments shifting by an average of 25 percentage points compared to single‑turn baselines. Stage‑level analysis attributes this shift largely to preference optimization, and while four inference‑time strategies offer partial mitigation, they do not fully resolve the issue.
arXiv:2608.28610v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Existing LLM moral evaluations typically present models with isolated moral vignettes and elicit a single-shot decision, neglecting a factor known to p...
arXiv:2608. 12368v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agreement with human judgments is a common proxy for evaluating the alignment of large language models (LLMs).
The paper investigates how large language models encode moral knowledge by training linear probes for each Moral Foundations Theory category and analyzing their geometric relationships. It finds that the model’s moral directions are largely independent yet share a common component, indicating integration rather than collapse into a single detector. This structure is consistent across architectures, emerges early in pre‑training, and reflects corpus statistics rather than the individualizing/binding distinction of Moral Foundations Theory.
arXiv:2608. 08061v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The key question in moral judgement is not simply whether someone chooses the "right" answer, but how they decide what matters most when moral principles conflict.
The article argues that current evaluations of large language models’ moral competence focus mainly on whether outputs align with human moral values—the so‑called moral value problem—while neglecting the moral norm problem, which concerns the models’ ability to identify and apply context‑sensitive moral norms. It attributes this imbalance to the field’s reliance on descriptive ethics frameworks that emphasize value representation over normative application. The authors review existing benchmarks, highlight three gaps—lack of ground‑truth norm data, insufficient evaluation of intermediate reasoning, and limited focus on context‑relevant features—and propose a research agenda to develop formal normative representations, expert‑annotated datasets, and evaluation protocols that distinguish between value‑level and norm‑level competence.