arXiv:2606. 11635v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly.
By Menghang Zhu, Seth Lazar
arXiv:2608. 12368v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agreement with human judgments is a common proxy for evaluating the alignment of large language models (LLMs).
By Octavian M. Machidon, Alina L. Machidon, Vojko Strahovnik, Mateja Centa Strahovnik, Jonas Miklav\v{c}i\v{c}, Marko Robnik \v{S}ikonja
arXiv:2510. 16380v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us.
By Yu Ying Chiu, Michael S. Lee, Rachel Calcott, Brandon Handoko, Paul de Font-Reaulx, Rapha\"el Milli\`ere, Paula Rodriguez, Chen Bo Calvin Zhang, Ziwen Han, Udari Madhushani Sehwag, Yash Maurya, Christina Q Knight, Harry R. Lloyd, Florence Bacus, Conor Downey, Mantas Mazeika, Bing Liu, Yejin Choi, Mitchell L Gordon, Sydney Levine
arXiv:2603. 00048v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive applications including psychological support, healthcare, and high-stakes decision-making.
By Erica Coppolillo, Emilio Ferrara
arXiv:2604. 24155v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The project of aligning machine behavior with human values raises a basic problem: whose moral expectations should guide AI decision-making?
By Benjamin Minhao Chen, Xinyu Xie
arXiv:2608. 14522v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems make more morally loaded decisions across society, one response has been moral preference elicitation.
By Taenyun Kim, Edyta Bogucka, Daniele Quercia
arXiv:2608. 08061v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The key question in moral judgement is not simply whether someone chooses the "right" answer, but how they decide what matters most when moral principles conflict.
By Siddarth Singh, Victoria Williams, Simon Rosen, Ebenezer Gelo, Helen Sarah Robertson, Ibrahim Suder, Benjamin Rosman, Geraud Nangue Tasse, Steven James
The paper argues that aligning large language models (LLMs) at the level of latent representations—specifically by matching their internal categorization of moral concepts to human prototype-based judgments—improves safety. Current alignment methods that focus on observable responses fail to preserve fine-grained moral categorization, leaving models vulnerable to adversarial rephrasings. By optimizing representational similarity, the authors demonstrate that LLMs can maintain more robust moral categorization and exhibit better adversarial robustness across multiple benchmarks and model sizes.
By Lingyu Li, Yan Teng, Yingchun Wang, Xia Hu
arXiv:2608. 15354v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs are increasingly used in morally sensitive contexts, yet it is unclear whether they apply ethical principles consistently across situations.
By Pegah Nokhiz, Aravinda Kanchana Ruwanpathirana, Helen Nissenbaum
arXiv:2607. 00002v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Moral cognition has traditionally been modeled as adherence to fixed ethical theories--deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics--implemented as static rules or value functions.
By Max Kanwal, Caryn Tran, Patrick Mineault
arXiv:2605. 03217v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings that require nuanced ethical reasoning, yet existing bias evaluations treat model outputs as simply "biased" or "unbiased.
By Yash Aggarwal, Atmika Gorti, Vinija Jain, Aman Chadha, Krishnaprasad Thirunarayan, Manas Gaur
arXiv:2606. 15507v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Behavioral audits of Large Language Models on moral prompts measure what the model says, not the internal computation producing it.
By Ali Dasdan, Manan Shah, W. Russell Neuman, Chad Coleman, Kund Meghani, Safinah Ali