arXiv:2510. 16380v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us.
By Yu Ying Chiu, Michael S. Lee, Rachel Calcott, Brandon Handoko, Paul de Font-Reaulx, Rapha\"el Milli\`ere, Paula Rodriguez, Chen Bo Calvin Zhang, Ziwen Han, Udari Madhushani Sehwag, Yash Maurya, Christina Q Knight, Harry R. Lloyd, Florence Bacus, Conor Downey, Mantas Mazeika, Bing Liu, Yejin Choi, Mitchell L Gordon, Sydney Levine
arXiv:2606. 11635v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly.
By Menghang Zhu, Seth Lazar
The article argues that current evaluations of large language models’ moral competence focus mainly on whether outputs align with human moral values—the so‑called moral value problem—while neglecting the moral norm problem, which concerns the models’ ability to identify and apply context‑sensitive moral norms. It attributes this imbalance to the field’s reliance on descriptive ethics frameworks that emphasize value representation over normative application. The authors review existing benchmarks, highlight three gaps—lack of ground‑truth norm data, insufficient evaluation of intermediate reasoning, and limited focus on context‑relevant features—and propose a research agenda to develop formal normative representations, expert‑annotated datasets, and evaluation protocols that distinguish between value‑level and norm‑level competence.
By Aidan Kierans, Ritam Dutt, Kaley Rittichier, Shiri Dori-Hacohen, Avijit Ghosh
The paper argues that AI alignment depends on a system’s ability to exhibit a coherent moral policy—stable, monotonic, decisive, and Pareto‑viable—rather than on any specific moral standard. The authors test nine large language models across varied moral scenarios and find that none maintain consistent verdicts, with surface‑form changes causing up to 99% shifts in outcomes. This indicates that current LLM agents lack the structural moral competence required for meaningful alignment.
By Arno Libert, Derck W. E. Prinzhorn, Daan R. Henselmans
arXiv:2606. 12754v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment?
By Danica Dillion, Chen Cecilia Liu, Baihui Wang, Daniele Barolo, Tanmay Rajore, Niket Tandon, Pranathi Ravikumar, Kurt Gray
The paper investigates how large language models encode moral knowledge by training linear probes for each Moral Foundations Theory category and analyzing their geometric relationships. It finds that the model’s moral directions are largely independent yet share a common component, indicating integration rather than collapse into a single detector. This structure is consistent across architectures, emerges early in pre‑training, and reflects corpus statistics rather than the individualizing/binding distinction of Moral Foundations Theory.