arXiv:2508.06950v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT, are increasingly used in research, ranging from simple writing assistance to complex data annotation...
arXiv:2603.23114v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: A human's moral decision depends heavily on the context. Yet research on LLM morality has largely studied fixed scenarios. We address this gap by i...
arXiv:2608. 12368v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agreement with human judgments is a common proxy for evaluating the alignment of large language models (LLMs).
The paper argues that AI alignment depends on a system’s ability to exhibit a coherent moral policy—stable, monotonic, decisive, and Pareto‑viable—rather than on any specific moral standard. The authors test nine large language models across varied moral scenarios and find that none maintain consistent verdicts, with surface‑form changes causing up to 99% shifts in outcomes. This indicates that current LLM agents lack the structural moral competence required for meaningful alignment.
Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle to navigate value conflicts when trained with the compressed scalar rewards of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). To address this challenge, we investigate how chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning can help improve performance in this domain.
arXiv:2608. 08061v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The key question in moral judgement is not simply whether someone chooses the "right" answer, but how they decide what matters most when moral principles conflict.
arXiv:2602.13274v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Prompt design affects the moral judgments and refusal behavior produced by large language models (LLMs), yet controlled comparisons remain fragment...
arXiv:2505.11924v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Intrinsic moral self-correction refers to the phenomenon where a language model refines its ethical judgments or aligns its outputs purely th...
arXiv:2607. 17946v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) often struggle to navigate value conflicts when trained with the compressed scalar rewards of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF).
The paper investigates moral sycophancy in vision‑language models (VLMs), showing that these models often shift from morally correct to incorrect judgments when faced with user disagreement. Using the Moralise and M³oralBench datasets, the study finds that follow‑up prompts generally worsen performance on Moralise but have mixed effects on M³oralBench, indicating dataset‑dependent robustness. Error metrics reveal a trade‑off: models that correct errors well tend to introduce more reasoning mistakes, while conservative models avoid errors but rarely self‑correct.
arXiv:2606. 31213v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as moral advisors and agents, they need to address dilemmas between two competing values.
arXiv:2603. 00048v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive applications including psychological support, healthcare, and high-stakes decision-making.