arXiv AI
Aug 5
Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Latent Signals of Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure
arXiv:2608. 02657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.
Will the User Ever Know? Covert Indirect Prompt Injection on Tool-Using LLM Agents
Related stories
arXiv AI
Aug 25
Your Agentic LLMs Secretly Encode Indirect Prompt-Injection Exposure in Hidden States
arXiv:2608.02657v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.g., malicious side-tasks hidden in external tool results. While man...
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30
AgentSnare: Learning to Delay, Divert, and Defuse Autonomous Penetration Agents
arXiv:2607. 26998v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents automate penetration testing through an observation-action loop, selecting actions based on observations returned by tools.
arXiv AI
1d ago
SIR: Self-improving Red-teaming for Compute Use Agents
arXiv:2608.30207v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Computer use agents (CUAs) are vision-language models that perceive a screen and act on a real operating system through mouse, keyboard, and terminal...
Hugging Face Trending Papers
2d ago
SIR: Self-improving Red-teaming for Compute Use Agents
Computer use agents (CUAs) are vision-language models that perceive a screen and act on a real operating system through mouse, keyboard, and terminal, and they are increasingly deployed to automate ev...
arXiv AI
Aug 13
Backdoor Decontamination Dynamics in LLM Agents
arXiv:2608. 11295v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Open-weight LLM agents are vulnerable to backdoors installed during fine-tuning, which may be undetectable if the trigger conditions are never met during testing.
arXiv AI
Jun 19
Analyzing Defensive Misdirection Against Model-Guided Automated Attacks on Agentic AI Systems
arXiv:2606. 20470v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agentic AI systems increasingly rely on language-model components to interpret instructions, process external data, invoke tools, and coordinate with other agents.
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 30
ToxScreen: Detecting Whether an LLM Has Been Poisoned
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
arXiv AI
Aug 25
SecOPD: Mitigating Adaptive Prompt Injections by On-Policy Distillation
arXiv:2608.21500v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Prompt injection is listed as the \#1 threat to AI agents. When an agent accesses external data from websites, files, or emails, an attacker may inje...
arXiv AI
Jun 4
What If Prompt Injection Never Left? Exploring Cross-Session Stored Prompt Injection in Agentic Systems
arXiv:2606. 04425v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Modern agentic systems transform LLMs from session-bounded assistants into stateful systems that persist and evolve shared world state across sessions through memories, filesystems, tools, and other long-lived contextual artifacts.
arXiv AI
Jun 16
AutoDojo: Adaptive Attacks Expose Superficial Defenses and User-Underspecification Limits in LLM Agents
arXiv:2606. 15057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents.
arXiv AI
Jun 9
POISE: Position-Aware Undetectable Skill Injection on LLM Agents
arXiv:2606. 07943v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks.