arXiv AI By Subhabrata Majumdar, Rajlakshmi Chavan

Defensive Sufficiency in a Stackelberg Model of AI Security

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The paper investigates how feedback from automated testing, human red teaming, and incident response can enhance AI system defenses by enabling effective repairs. It establishes conditions under which a finite attack surface is defended with probability one, derives completion-time bounds, and extends the analysis to dynamic attack surfaces and generalized repairs. A defender-led Stackelberg game is formulated to determine the least-cost allocation of proactive discovery and reactive repair, revealing equilibrium regimes where the defender may invest in none, one, or both capabilities, and demonstrates through numerical experiments that faster repair can shorten compromise duration without lowering compromise probability.

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