arXiv:2511. 21214v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Explicit safety policies can improve reasoning-model safety, but their effective coverage may lag behind evolving jailbreak strategies.
By Yuhang Wang, Yanxu Zhu, Jiaming Zhang, Dongyuan Lu, Jitao Sang
arXiv:2607. 23496v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards.
By Ziheng Peng, Huiqi Deng, Haoran Jing, Xuankun Rong, Jiahui Han, Xiting Wang, Na Zou, Xia Hu
Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards. Existing red-teaming methods empirically identify effective scenarios through observed attack outcomes, but why particular scenarios weaken refusal remains mechanistically unclear.
arXiv:2607. 07903v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial prompts and jailbreak attacks.
By Anupam Wagle, Ifrat Ikhtear Uddin, Chaowei Zhang, Longwei Wang
arXiv:2606. 05614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content.
By Long P. Hoang, Hai V. Le, Shaoyang Xu, Wei Lu, Wenxuan Zhang
arXiv:2606. 19168v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: To achieve deeper safety alignment for large language models (LLMs), recent efforts have studied how to push safety interventions earlier into the pretraining stage, primarily by filtering unsafe data or rewriting it into safer forms.
By Jinhan Li, Kexian Tang, Yihan Xu, Zhuorui Ye, Kaifeng Lyu
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2605. 28591v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The validity of AI safety evaluations depends on models behaving consistently across controlled and deployment settings.
By Katharina Deckenbach, Haritz Puerto, Jonas Geiping, Sahar Abdelnabi
arXiv:2606. 16808v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: While Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex tasks, they remain highly vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreaks and direct harmful queries.
By Ke Miao, Jiaxin Li, Hongliang Chen, Yuke Hu, Zhan Qin
arXiv:2606. 00686v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The prevailing paradigm in large language model (LLM) alignment operates via erasure, filtering unsafe data or training models to strictly refuse harmful prompts.
By Maryam Hashemzadeh, Jerry Huang, Minseon Kim, Marc-Alexandre C\^ot\'e, Sarath Chandar
arXiv:2606. 25750v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy.
By Chang-Chieh Huang, Yan-Lun Chen, Chia-Mu Yu, Wei-Bin Lee
arXiv:2607. 18725v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly fine-tuned for critical-domain Question-Answering (QA), yet choosing which small model to adapt, before paying the cost of adaptation, remains difficult.
By Shaswata Mitra, Subash Neupane, Trisha Chakraborty, Himanshu Tripathi, Sudip Mittal, Aritran Piplai, Shahram Rahimi