arXiv:2604. 04385v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We localize the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models.
arXiv:2609.25602v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In language models, the choice between believing the prompt and believing the weights is made by a handful of identifiable attention heads. Instruction...
The paper introduces a three-level evaluation framework—behavioral deployment, LM-head readout, and probe recoverability—to distinguish whether a language model fails a syntactic test by not encoding structure or by failing to use it. Using a trilingual control-dependency benchmark, the authors find that probe recoverability consistently exceeds LM-head readout, which in turn exceeds behavioral deployment across seven models and three languages, with the largest gap observed in Qwen3-0.6B Instruct. Layer-localized activation patching shows that instruction tuning shifts the decoded layer later, suggesting decoding favors surface shortcuts and that behavioral evaluation understates what models encode while probing alone overstates what they deploy.
arXiv:2609.38205v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: System prompts are the primary lever practitioners use to control language model behavior, yet what they actually do to the computation inside the tran...
The paper investigates where the ‘refusal’ behavior of language models resides across different architectures. It finds that a single direction in the residual stream governs refusal in transformers, and that the same direction—after a rigid rotation—also governs refusal in state‑space models (SSMs). By aligning these directions and applying a detector‑triggered gate, the authors demonstrate that refusal can be effectively transferred across transformer, SSM, recurrent, and hybrid architectures, showing that safety tooling can be ported by re‑estimating the direction at each architecture’s write site rather than rebuilding it from scratch.
arXiv:2606. 22686v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque.
arXiv:2608. 11583v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety alignment in large language models is often treated as a distributed property of the entire network, yet its practical brittleness suggests that refusal behavior may be concentrated in a smaller set of parameters.
arXiv:2608.29109v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models often answer structurally unanswerable questions, such as computing cot(-540{\deg}) or evaluating (1).startswith("1"), instead of...
arXiv:2609.00051v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Despite extensive alignment efforts, Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to generating unsafe content under adversarial prompting, yet the...
arXiv:2606. 05378v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We test whether a single screen-and-ablate recipe -- identify attention-head circuits by task-pattern selectivity, then verify by causal ablation against a matched-random null -- produces consistent mechanistic claims across model families.
arXiv:2603. 22473v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Hybrid language models combine softmax attention with linear-time sequence mechanisms such as state-space or linear-attention layers, but the functional contribution of each component type remains insufficiently characterized.
arXiv:2609.00064v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: In-context learning (ICL) lets large language models adapt to new tasks from demonstrations, and fine-tuning can erode this behaviour. Many preservat...
arXiv:2606.22676v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Refusal on a safety benchmark does not reveal how stable that behavior will remain after model updates. Benign downstream fine-tuning can weaken re...