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arXiv:2609.25602v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In language models, the choice between believing the prompt and believing the weights is made by a handful of identifiable attention heads. Instruction...
arXiv:2606. 22686v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on extensive safety alignment, yet the mechanistic basis of refusal remains opaque.
The paper investigates how large language models balance instruction-following with pattern completion when the two objectives conflict. By creating dialogues where a user instruction to act in a target way T is opposed by assistant turns that demonstrate a competing pattern P, the authors measure instruction-following rates across 13 models and 16 instructions over up to 50 turns. Results show wide variability (1%–99%) in instruction adherence, with robustness influenced by instruction content, output format, and chain-of-thought reasoning, but overall instruction-following remains brittle under induction pressure.
arXiv:2604. 04385v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We localize the policy routing mechanism in alignment-trained language models.
arXiv:2606. 12747v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-relevant studies of language models, including alignment and jailbreaking evaluations and AI control protocols, often rely on prefilling model outputs.
arXiv:2606. 08292v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Mechanistic studies often assign a component a role when removing it damages a behavior, its activation linearly encodes task information, and restoring that activation repairs the damage.