arXiv AI
Jul 1
Understanding and Evaluating Claw-like Agent Security Through a Computer-Systems Lens
arXiv:2606. 30755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Claw-like AI agents (e.
Mako: A Self-Evolving Agentic Operating System (SE-AOS) for Autonomous Web Exploitation
arXiv:2607. 11288v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: We introduce the Self-Evolving Agentic Operating System (SE-AOS): a new class of AI agent that treats exploit capability as a mutable, versioned kernel it extends at runtime, observing its own failures, synthesising new capabilities, proving them against a live target, and hot-loading them back into itself.
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arXiv AI
Jun 15
AgentCyberRange: Benchmarking Frontier AI Systems in Realistic Cyber Ranges
arXiv:2606. 14295v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier AI systems are increasingly capable of cybersecurity tasks, including codebase inspection, vulnerability detection, and exploitation.
arXiv AI
Jun 15
From Shield to Target: Denial-of-Service Attacks on LLM-Based Agent Guardrails
arXiv:2606. 14517v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM-based guardrails have emerged as a highly effective defense against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks in autonomous agents.
arXiv AI
Jun 17
CyberEvolver: Structured Self-Evolution for Cybersecurity Agents On the Fly
arXiv:2605. 26195v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based agents are increasingly used for cybersecurity tasks, but most existing systems rely on fixed, human-designed scaffolds that struggle to adapt across diverse targets and failure modes.
arXiv AI
Jun 12
The Emergence of Autonomous Penetration Capabilities in Large Language Model-Powered AI Systems
arXiv:2606. 13079v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Nowadays, the autonomous execution of cyberattacks capable of causing substantial real-world harm is widely regarded as one of the critical red lines that frontier AI systems must not cross.
arXiv AI
Sep 12
Beyond Static Guarantees: Measuring the Static-Pass Dynamic-Fail Gap in Security-Sensitive and LLM-Generated Python Code
The paper introduces the Static‑Pass Dynamic‑Fail (SPDF) phenomenon, showing that static analysis can miss vulnerabilities that are exploitable at runtime. Using a three‑stage pipeline—static scanning, LLM‑driven CWE reasoning, and autonomous exploit verification—it evaluated 1,355 Python samples and found that 14.53% of samples that passed static checks were actually exploitable. The study highlights that static‑analysis success and runtime security are distinct assurance layers, especially for AI‑generated and security‑sensitive code.
arXiv Machine Learning
Jun 25
The Unfireable Safety Kernel: Execution-Time AI Alignment for AI Agents and Other Escapable AI Systems
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
arXiv AI
Jun 12
Who Pays the Price? Stakeholder-Centric Prompt Injection Benchmarking for Real-world Web Agents
arXiv:2606. 13385v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences.
arXiv AI
Jul 14
Agent Hacks Agent: Autoresearch for Production-Agent Red-Teaming
arXiv:2607. 11698v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Production LLM agents such as Claude Code and Codex operate over untrusted content, files, commands, and workspace state, making safety failures directly actionable.
arXiv AI
Aug 18
SysEvolve: An AI-native, safe, autonomous adversarial attack-defense co-evolutionary system
arXiv:2608. 15012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has created a growing asymmetry in cybersecurity, where attack accelerates toward autonomous execution while defense remains predominantly human-intensive.
arXiv AI
Jun 17
Breaking the Code: Security Assessment of AI Code Agents Through Systematic Jailbreaking Attacks
arXiv:2510. 01359v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Code-capable large language model (LLM) agents are embedded in software engineering workflows where they can read, write, and execute code, raising "jailbreak" stakes beyond text-only settings.
arXiv AI
Jun 16
AutoDojo: Adaptive Attacks Expose Superficial Defenses and User-Underspecification Limits in LLM Agents
arXiv:2606. 15057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents.