arXiv AI By Peizhi Niu, Wenjie Qu, Shangding Gu, Tianneng Shi, Yuankai Li, Ahmad Tawaha, Hend Alzahrani, Vincent Siu, Boyi Li, Chenguang Wang, Jiaheng Zhang, Basel Alomair, Ming Jin, Muhao Chen, Chi Wang, Costas Spanos, Dawn Song

Understanding and Evaluating Claw-like Agent Security Through a Computer-Systems Lens

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arXiv:2606. 30755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Claw-like AI agents (e.

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