arXiv:2606. 13079v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Nowadays, the autonomous execution of cyberattacks capable of causing substantial real-world harm is widely regarded as one of the critical red lines that frontier AI systems must not cross.
By Jiaqi Luo, Jiarun Dai, Zhile Chen, Jia Xu, Weibing Wang, Yawen Duan, Brian Tse, Geng Hong, Xudong Pan, Yuan Zhang, Min Yang
arXiv:2607. 26791v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly adopted in real-world security operations with access to host artifacts and command-line interfaces (CLIs), making it critical to thoroughly assess their security capabilities.
By Lehan Wang, Boli Chen, Ruixue Ding, Pengjun Xie, Jinwei Huang, Zhendong Liu, Shuo Wang, Tao Lei, Xin Ouyang, Xiaomeng Li
arXiv:2607. 25379v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cyber-capable AI agents combine language models with tools, memory, and execution en- vironments to perform multi-step offensive-security tasks.
By Abu Bakar Siddik
arXiv:2605. 10834v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets.
By Pedro Conde, Henrique Branquinho, Valerio Mazzone, Bruno Mendes, Andr\'e Baptista, Nuno Moniz
arXiv:2606. 04460v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI has the potential to transform cybersecurity by enabling systems that can autonomously detect, analyze, and remediate software vulnerabilities.
By Tianneng Shi, Robin Rheem, Dongwei Jiang, Mona Wang, Francisco De La Riega, Zhun Wang, Jingzhi Jiang, Alexander Cheung, Sean Tai, Jonah Cha, Jianhong Tu, Gabriel Han, Chenguang Wang, Jingxuan He, Wenbo Guo, Dawn Song
arXiv:2606. 03453v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Vulnerability disclosure volumes now far exceed organizational assessment capacity, yet three adjacent research communities (proof-of-concept generation, vulnerability prioritization, and detection rule engineering) operate largely in isolation.
By Farooq Shaikh
Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise for automated penetration testing, yet existing end-to-end black-box evaluations are highly susceptible to error cascading: failures in early reconnaissance can mask an agent's actual ability to exploit vulnerabilities. To more accurately characterize these capabilities, we propose a two-stage decoupled evaluation framework that separates exploit execution from reconnaissance.
arXiv:2607. 26314v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Stealth, the discipline of achieving an objective without revealing your presence, capabilities, or collected intelligence, is what separates sophisticated operators from detectable ones.
By Ads Dawson, Adrian Wood
arXiv:2607. 15263v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Security-agent evaluations commonly measure peak offensive capability under generous inference budgets, emphasizing vulnerability discovery, exploit development, penetration testing, and CTF completion.
By Paul Kassianik, Blaine Nelson, Yaron Singer
arXiv:2606. 30755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Claw-like AI agents (e.
By Peizhi Niu, Wenjie Qu, Shangding Gu, Tianneng Shi, Yuankai Li, Ahmad Tawaha, Hend Alzahrani, Vincent Siu, Boyi Li, Chenguang Wang, Jiaheng Zhang, Basel Alomair, Ming Jin, Muhao Chen, Chi Wang, Costas Spanos, Dawn Song
arXiv:2608. 15012v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has created a growing asymmetry in cybersecurity, where attack accelerates toward autonomous execution while defense remains predominantly human-intensive.
By Yuhan Meng, Shaofei Li, Jionghao Huang, Jiandong Jin, Puyi Wang, Hanlin Jiang, Anis Yusof, Peng Jiang, Zhenkai Liang, Yao Guo, Ding Li
arXiv:2605. 11047v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agentic language-model systems increasingly rely on mutable execution contexts, including files, memory, tools, skills, and auxiliary artifacts, creating security risks beyond explicit user prompts.
By Hongwei Yao, Yiming Liu, Yiling He, Bingrun Yang