Web agents are increasingly deployed to complete tasks autonomously on real websites, where adversarially injected content can induce them to perform unauthorized actions. Existing evaluations primari...
arXiv:2602. 09222v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) based web agents are increasingly deployed to automate complex online tasks by directly interacting with web sites and performing actions on users' behalf.
By Georgios Syros, Evan Rose, Brian Grinstead, Christoph Kerschbaumer, William Robertson, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Alina Oprea
The paper examines how AI agents that interact directly with web service backends alter the exploitation of existing web vulnerabilities. Using the VELA benchmark, which includes 44 vulnerabilities across twelve application families, the authors evaluate three commercial agents and find that exploitability is largely determined by the interface design rather than the agent itself, with 91% of vulnerabilities remaining exploitable under the reference configuration. Interface restrictions can reduce attack success, yet the agents generally do not introduce new failures, and in some cases even complete attacks that users omitted.
By Ruozhao Yang, Jiongchi Yu, Ming Hu, Xiaofei Xie
arXiv:2606. 13385v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences.
By Zihao Wang, Yiming Li, Yutong Wu, Zheyu Liu, Kangjie Chen, Fok Kar Wai, Pin-Yu Chen, Vrizlynn L. L. Thing, Bo Li, Dacheng Tao, Tianwei Zhang
AutoRedClaw is an automated red‑teaming framework designed for claw‑style agents such as OpenClaw, which maintain persistent configuration, memory, and reusable skills. It generates end‑to‑end attacks and the necessary environments, using a strict quality‑checking protocol and execution‑based validation to ensure realistic, effective samples. The framework produces a 330‑case benchmark, RedClaw‑Bench, achieving over 30% effective attack rate at less than $0.10 per successful sample and demonstrating higher attack success rates than existing benchmarks across multiple agent systems.
By Hao Li, Tongyan Hu, Weidi Luo, Shanghao Shi, Xiaogeng Liu, Aiden Suh, Yulong Cao, Ning Zhang, William Yeoh, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Chaowei Xiao
arXiv:2606. 02240v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls.
By Hiskias Dingeto, Will Leeney
arXiv:2608.30207v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Computer use agents (CUAs) are vision-language models that perceive a screen and act on a real operating system through mouse, keyboard, and terminal...
By Chen Xiong, Zhiyuan He, Pin-Yu Chen, Stjepan Picek, Tsung-Yi Ho
arXiv:2606.00497v2 Announce Type: replace-cross
Abstract: Deceptive web content, widely instantiated across the internet and commonly known as \textit{social-engineering attacks}, manipulates autonom...
By Soham Roy, Sarthakbrata Halder, Arya Bharaty, Vaibhav Bhaskar, Yash Sinha, Dhruv Kumar, Srikant Panda, Murari Mandal
arXiv:2610.17020v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Cybersecurity evaluations of AI agents have focused largely on offense, yet a working exploit does not show that an agent can make software safe. An...
By Gonzalo Gonzalez-Pumariega, Ajay Jagannath, Adit Jain, Guram Gogia, Soumyadeep Bakshi, Nazneen Rajani
ProtoArena is a new black-box benchmark that tests AI agents on 80 cross‑component vulnerability‑exploitation environments across 11 protocol and application domains and 7 attack categories. It evaluates agents at three information levels—guided reproduction, exploitation with context, and effect‑directed black‑box exploration—using a hybrid verifier that combines rule‑based checks with LLM review of traffic and logs. In experiments, Claude Opus 4.8 achieved the highest success rates, reaching 48.8% under guided conditions and 12.5% in effect‑directed black‑box scenarios, while also demonstrating significant DNSBomb optimization performance.
By Fasheng Miao, Zhaoyu Hu, Xiang Li, Changqing An, Jiutian Zeng, Longtao Huang, Haixin Duan, Jilong Wang
arXiv:2606. 30755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Claw-like AI agents (e.
By Peizhi Niu, Wenjie Qu, Shangding Gu, Tianneng Shi, Yuankai Li, Ahmad Tawaha, Hend Alzahrani, Vincent Siu, Boyi Li, Chenguang Wang, Jiaheng Zhang, Basel Alomair, Ming Jin, Muhao Chen, Chi Wang, Costas Spanos, Dawn Song
arXiv:2606. 14295v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Frontier AI systems are increasingly capable of cybersecurity tasks, including codebase inspection, vulnerability detection, and exploitation.
By Fengyu Liu, Jiarun Dai, Yihe Fan, Wuyuao Mai, Ziao Li, Bofei Chen, Jie Zhang, Zheng Lou, Bocheng Xiang, Qiyi Zhang, Xudong Pan, Geng Hong, Yuan Zhang, Min Yang