TrojanGYM is an LLM‑driven framework that automatically generates diverse hardware Trojan (HT) insertions to expose blind spots in learning‑based detectors. It uses multiple large language models to propose and refine RTL modifications, while an agentic loop with syntactic checks, functional verification, and GNN‑based detectors iteratively improves the HT designs. The authors also present Robust‑GNN4TJ, a more robust detector that improves detection rates on TrojanGYM benchmarks, and demonstrate that TrojanGYM can achieve up to 68.75% evasion against modern GNN detectors on SRAM, AES‑128, UART, and RISC‑V RTL designs.
arXiv:2606. 00801v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Current approaches to LLM adversarial testing suffer from coverage gaps: manual red-teaming does not scale, LLM-as-attacker methods exhibit mode collapse, and gradient-based approaches produce uninterpretable gibberish.
arXiv:2605. 10807v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into Electronic Design Automation (EDA) and hardware security is rapidly reshaping the semiconductor industry.
arXiv:2606. 20502v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved.
The paper investigates how inference optimization for large language models can introduce numerical inconsistencies that trigger hidden backdoors. It introduces two types of optimization‑triggered backdoors: the Input‑Specific Optimization Backdoor (ISOB) and the Universal Optimization Backdoor (UOB), the latter enabling a model to remain benign under normal execution but activate a backdoor when optimization is applied. Experiments on seven open‑source LLMs, across multiple tasks and optimization backends, show UOB can achieve up to 100% attack success while maintaining clean accuracy, and the authors propose three defenses that reduce the attack success rate to 0.02.
arXiv:2608. 01388v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Runtime safety monitors based on Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and finite automata (FSA) are increasingly deployed to intercept unsafe tool-call sequences in LLM agents.
arXiv:2602. 15751v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: This paper presents an end-to-end demonstration of a viable, ultra-fast, radiation-hard machine learning (ML) application on FPGAs, which could be used in future high-energy physics experiments.
The paper proposes universal, tool‑based defenses for large language model agents that use external tools, addressing four types of adversarial attacks: direct and indirect prompt injection, memory poisoning, and backdoor attacks. Two main defenses are introduced: Attacker Tool Filtering, which uses anomaly detection to remove suspicious tools, and Normal Tool Recalling, which restores the agent’s original toolset before planning. The authors also add prompt‑based defenses such as Chain‑of‑Thought prompting and self‑reflection, and demonstrate that these methods dramatically lower attack success rates—often to 0%—across multiple open‑source and proprietary LLMs while maintaining or improving task performance.
arXiv:2602. 04894v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLMs are increasingly used for code generation, but their outputs often follow recurring templates that can induce predictable vulnerabilities.
The paper proposes a neurosymbolic defense architecture for AI-enhanced Security Operations Centers (AI‑SOCs) that protects against indirect prompt injection via log poisoning. It combines deterministic SIEM decoders as a pre‑filter with NeMo Guardrails for semantic validation, and adds a closed‑loop telemetry system for Human‑in‑the‑Loop visibility. Experimental results mapped to the MITRE ATLAS taxonomy show the approach effectively dismantles promptware kill chains and delivers a resilient, observable defense for next‑generation AI‑SOCs.
arXiv:2604. 06247v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaks and prompt injections delivered through text or images.
arXiv:2603. 24511v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We show that AI agents are capable of discovering novel algorithms for adversarial attacks against LLMs, advancing the state of the art on white-box jailbreaking and prompt injection evaluations.
arXiv:2607. 23882v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern System-on-Chip (SoCs) often contain hundreds of millions to tens of billions of gates, making existing Hardware Trojan (HT) detection methods impractical due to their immense scale.