arXiv Machine Learning

ADVERSARIAL: And-Inverter Graph-Assisted Hardware Trojan Detection At Scale

arXiv:2607. 23882v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Modern System-on-Chip (SoCs) often contain hundreds of millions to tens of billions of gates, making existing Hardware Trojan (HT) detection methods impractical due to their immense scale.

arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 27

On the Depth Scalability of Logic Gate Networks

arXiv:2607. 21633v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Logic Gate Networks (LGNs) implement computation through compositions of Boolean operations, yet unlike classical Boolean circuits, existing LGNs do not reliably benefit from increased depth.

By Taegun An, Dohun kim, Haebeom Lee, Changhee Joo
arXiv Machine Learning
Jul 9

Structural Adversarial Attacks on Relational Deep Learning under Integrity Constraints

arXiv:2607. 07089v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Relational Deep Learning (RDL) has become a standard methodology for machine learning on relational databases: the database is encoded as a heterogeneous temporal graph in which tuples become nodes and primary-key to foreign-key (PK-FK) dependencies become typed edges, over which a graph neural network is trained for downstream prediction.

By Alan Gany, Bogdan Cautis, Silviu Maniu
arXiv AI
Sep 11

Kernel-Complexity Edge Sanitization for Training-Free Defense against Structural Graph Attacks

Kernel-Complexity Edge Sanitization (KCES) is a training‑free, model‑agnostic defense for Graph Neural Networks that identifies and removes edges with high Kernel‑Complexity (KC) scores, which are indicative of structural influence on the graph kernel complexity metric. KCES leverages a theoretical upper bound on GNN test error derived from the graph Gram matrix to compute edge‑specific KC scores, pruning edges that are empirically enriched with adversarial perturbations. The method is computationally efficient, scalable to large graphs, and consistently outperforms representative robust baselines across diverse attack settings without requiring retraining.

By Yaning Jia, Shenyang Deng, Yaoqing Yang, Chiyu Ma, Wenxuan Xu, Soroush Vosoughi
arXiv AI
Aug 20

TrojanGYM: A Detector-in-the-Loop LLM for Adaptive RTL Hardware Trojan Insertion

TrojanGYM is an LLM‑driven framework that automatically generates diverse hardware Trojan (HT) insertions to expose blind spots in learning‑based detectors. It uses multiple large language models to propose and refine RTL modifications, while an agentic loop with syntactic checks, functional verification, and GNN‑based detectors iteratively improves the HT designs. The authors also present Robust‑GNN4TJ, a more robust detector that improves detection rates on TrojanGYM benchmarks, and demonstrate that TrojanGYM can achieve up to 68.75% evasion against modern GNN detectors on SRAM, AES‑128, UART, and RISC‑V RTL designs.

By Saideep Sreekumar, Zeng Wang, Akashdeep Saha, Weihua Xiao, Minghao Shao, Muhammad Shafique, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Ramesh Karri, Johann Knechtel
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 8

Structural Adversarial Attacks on Relational Deep Learning under Integrity Constraints

Relational Deep Learning (RDL) has become a standard methodology for machine learning on relational databases: the database is encoded as a heterogeneous temporal graph in which tuples become nodes and primary-key to foreign-key (PK-FK) dependencies become typed edges, over which a graph neural network is trained for downstream prediction. We study the adversarial robustness of this pipeline.