arXiv:2510. 12229v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear.
By Bianca Raimondi, Daniela Dalbagno, Maurizio Gabbrielli
arXiv:2606. 15507v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Behavioral audits of Large Language Models on moral prompts measure what the model says, not the internal computation producing it.
By Ali Dasdan, Manan Shah, W. Russell Neuman, Chad Coleman, Kund Meghani, Safinah Ali
arXiv:2606. 12754v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment?
By Danica Dillion, Chen Cecilia Liu, Baihui Wang, Daniele Barolo, Tanmay Rajore, Niket Tandon, Pranathi Ravikumar, Kurt Gray
arXiv:2608. 12368v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agreement with human judgments is a common proxy for evaluating the alignment of large language models (LLMs).
By Octavian M. Machidon, Alina L. Machidon, Vojko Strahovnik, Mateja Centa Strahovnik, Jonas Miklav\v{c}i\v{c}, Marko Robnik \v{S}ikonja
arXiv:2605. 03217v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings that require nuanced ethical reasoning, yet existing bias evaluations treat model outputs as simply "biased" or "unbiased.
By Yash Aggarwal, Atmika Gorti, Vinija Jain, Aman Chadha, Krishnaprasad Thirunarayan, Manas Gaur
Emergent misalignment (EM) is the phenomenon where fine-tuning a language model on a narrow task leads to harmful behavior in unrelated domains. A leading mechanistic account attributes EM to persona features: latent directions acquired during pre-training that misaligned fine-tuning amplifies.
The study investigates how large language models encode moral knowledge by training linear probes for each category of Moral Foundations Theory. It finds that the model’s representations for different moral foundations occupy distinct, largely independent dimensions yet share a common positive component, indicating an integrated but nuanced moral structure. This geometry is consistent across model architectures and scales, emerges early in pre‑training, and reflects corpus statistics rather than the individualizing/binding distinction of the theory.
By Orion Reblitz-Richardson
arXiv:2608. 13250v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Normative datasets are often used to train and align AI systems, but the norms they contain can function as action-guiding patterns rather than neutral moral knowledge.
By Long Hoang Nguyen, Brice Valentin Kok-Shun, Guangyu Du, Ali Sunyaev
How do large language models (LLMs) organize moral knowledge? Models detect moral content broadly, but detection is a low bar. We ask whether they go further, distinguishing moral foundations from one...
arXiv:2602. 19101v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Value alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) requires us to empirically measure these models' actual, acquired representation of value.
By Seong Hah Cho, Junyi Li, Anna Leshinskaya
arXiv:2603. 26846v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As Large Language Models (LLMs) expand in capability and application scope, their trustworthiness becomes critical.
By Guoxi Zhang, Jiawei Chen, Tianzhuo Yang, Lang Qin, Juntao Dai, Yaodong Yang, Jingwei Yi
arXiv:2607. 21558v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Building socially calibrated large language models, which can learn from others without simply yielding to them, requires more than reducing sycophancy as a one-dimensional failure mode.
By Baihui Wang, Bernard Koch