arXiv:2606. 23700v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Emergent misalignment (EM) has been linked to the activation of misaligned persona vectors and evil character traits, suggesting that EM operates through disruption of the model's aligned character rather than direct learning of harmful content.
By Arush Tagade, Shaoheng Zhou, Jiaxin Wen, Shi Feng
arXiv:2607. 26389v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Fine-tuning a language model on data containing a narrow flaw, such as insecure code or incorrect mathematical answers, can cause broad misalignment through a mechanism that remains debated.
By Hasibur Rahman, Smit Desai
arXiv:2607. 20449v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLMs are trained predominantly on human-authored text, yet the structural and narrative conventions embedded in that text are rarely examined as a source of systematic behavioral influence, or as a governance risk in deployed systems.
By Adam Rigby, Raz Saremi, Azadeh Sohrabinejad, Mehdi Rahimi
Fine-tuning enables a source model to acquire desired capabilities and behaviors in a target domain while retaining much of its general-purpose competence. However, this adaptation process can also degrade alignment properties that were present in the source model.
Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment.
arXiv:2608. 13482v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As language-model-based AI is increasingly deployed in autonomous settings, aligning its goals and values with those of humans becomes critical.
By Julian Minder, Viktor Moskvoretskii, Raghav Singhal, Difan Jiao, Andy Arditi, Shaobo Cui, Yiderigun Borjigin, Kartik Bali, Stefan Krsteski, Harsh Raj, Huu Nguyen, Jannik Brinkmann, Ashton Anderson, Roland Aydin, Robert West
arXiv:2607. 13162v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: What a language model will and will not do is largely set during post-training, but which behaviors it expresses, hides, or resists is not revealed by prompting alone.
By Winston Zeng, Ali Emami, Jinho Choi
arXiv:2608. 04347v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Fine-tuning enables a source model to acquire desired capabilities and behaviors in a target domain while retaining much of its general-purpose competence.
By Kotaro Yoshida, Laura Gomezjurado Gonzalez, Yukinori Yamamoto, Yuji Naraki, Ryotaro Shimizu, Wenya Wang
arXiv:2604. 09544v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) undergo alignment training to avoid harmful behaviors, yet the resulting safeguards remain brittle: jailbreaks routinely bypass them, and fine-tuning on narrow domains can induce ``emergent misalignment'' that generalizes broadly.
By Hadas Orgad, Boyi Wei, Kaden Zheng, Martin Wattenberg, Peter Henderson, Seraphina Goldfarb-Tarrant, Yonatan Belinkov
arXiv:2606. 12747v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-relevant studies of language models, including alignment and jailbreaking evaluations and AI control protocols, often rely on prefilling model outputs.
By Andy Wang, Parv Mahajan, David Demitri Africa, Alexandra Souly, Jordan Taylor, Robert Kirk
arXiv:2606. 08682v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Activation steering has emerged as a popular inference-time technique for modulating the behavior of large language models (LLMs).
By Qi Cao, Jian Lou, Meiting Liu, Wenjie Feng, Dan Li, See-Kiong Ng, Anh Tuan Luu
arXiv:2605. 26397v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Safety alignment reduces explicitly harmful outputs but inadvertently encodes a sanitized, neuronormative representation of marginalized communication.
By Naba Rizvi, Mohammed Rizvi, Harper Strickland, Saleha Ahmedi, Nedjma Ousidhoum