arXiv:2607. 14651v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persistent external memory enhances agent continuity but introduces persistent security vulnerabilities: adversarial content can be injected via standard interaction channels, retained across turns, and later distort downstream behavior.
arXiv:2607. 27080v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Memory systems allow agents to retain and reuse information from past interactions, but they can also let malicious content persist.
arXiv:2606. 04329v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Memory is a core component of AI agents, enabling them to accumulate knowledge across interactions and improve performance.
arXiv:2607. 07903v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial prompts and jailbreak attacks.
arXiv:2606. 10742v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: External memory has become a core component of modern web agents, enabling long-horizon reasoning through the retrieval of past experiences.
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
arXiv:2606. 07963v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Backdoor attacks in large language models (LLMs) are often treated as isolated trigger-response failures, motivating defenses tailored to specific triggers or behaviors.
arXiv:2605. 08442v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Persistent memory attacks against LLM agents achieve high attack success rates against open-source models.
arXiv:2607. 15657v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multimodal AI agents increasingly rely on persistent long-term memory to ground generation in past visual and textual episodes.
arXiv:2607. 26849v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time.
arXiv:2604. 23130v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Jailbreak attacks expose a persistent failure mode in safety-aligned LLMs: models can be pushed into harmful behavior, but the internal representations enabling this shift remain poorly localized.
As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in high-stakes domains, adversaries may poison training data to implant backdoors: hidden triggers that covertly manipulate model behavior at inference time. We ask whether a defender can recover such a trigger under realistic affordances, namely white-box access to the weights and knowledge of the behavior of concern, but no training data, no trusted reference model, no knowledge of the trigger, and no certainty that the model is poisoned.
arXiv:2608. 10530v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) have undergone a shift from stateless conversational interfaces to autonomous agents capable of multi-step planning, tool invocation, code execution, and maintaining persistent memory.