arXiv AI

MemSecBench: Tracking Agent Memory Poisoning from Persistence to Consequence and Repair

arXiv:2607. 27080v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Memory systems allow agents to retain and reuse information from past interactions, but they can also let malicious content persist.

arXiv AI

Aug 5

Injection-Execution Dissociation: A Mechanistic Evaluation of Persistent Memory Attacks and Defenses in Stateful LLM Agents

arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.

By Jun Wen Leong

llms rag agents benchmarks safety

arXiv AI

4d ago

Trojan Hippo Bench: A Dynamic Benchmark for Persistent Memory Attacks and Defenses in LLM Agents

arXiv:2605.01970v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Memory systems enable otherwise stateless LLM agents to persist user information across sessions, but also introduce a new attack surface. Th...

By Debeshee Das, Julien Piet, Darya Kaviani, Luca Beurer-Kellner, Florian Tram\`er, David Wagner

llms rag agents multimodal benchmarks safety

arXiv AI

Aug 12

From Faulty Memories to Corrected Actions: Dependency-Guided Rollback Repair for Memory-Augmented Agents

arXiv:2608. 10502v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Persistent memory lets language-model agents reuse information across sessions, but it also makes errors durable: a poisoned, stale, or misattributed record can alter reasoning, tool use, answers, and subsequent memory writes.

By Caili Yu, Yiqi Wang, Jiaqi Zhang, Yiqun Duan, Mingkai Zheng, Zhangkai Wu, Kaize Shi, Taotao Cai

llms agents benchmarks

arXiv Machine Learning

Jun 25

Defense effectiveness across architectural layers: a mechanistic evaluation of persistent memory attacks on stateful LLM agents

arXiv:2605. 08442v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Persistent memory attacks against LLM agents achieve high attack success rates against open-source models.

By Jun Wen Leong

llms rag agents multimodal

arXiv AI

Sep 7

Forgetting Without Restarting: Execution-State Unlearning for Stateful LLM Agents

arXiv:2609. 04875v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Long-running LLM agents are stateful: beyond the transcript they accrete compressed summaries, plaintext memory, pending tool plans, and, under every serving API, a KV cache.

By Chao Yao, Yangbo Wei, Zhen Huang, Junhong Qian, Chenle Chen, Shaoqiang Lu, Chen Wu, Lei He

llms agents efficiency

arXiv AI

Jun 4

From Untrusted Input to Trusted Memory: A Systematic Study of Memory Poisoning Attacks in LLM Agents

arXiv:2606. 04329v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Memory is a core component of AI agents, enabling them to accumulate knowledge across interactions and improve performance.

By Pritam Dash, Tongyu Ge, Aditi Jain, Tanmay Shah, Zhiwei Shang

llms agents benchmarks safety

arXiv AI

Jul 7

When Claws Remember but Do Not Tell: Stealthy Memory Injection in Persistent Personal Agents

arXiv:2607. 05189v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution.

By Yechao Zhang, Shiqian Zhao, Jiawen Zhang, Jie Zhang, Gelei Deng, Xiaogeng Liu, Chaowei Xiao, Tianwei Zhang

llms agents reinforcement-learning fine-tuning benchmarks

arXiv AI

Sep 15

When Malicious Instructions Persist: Persistent Memory Poisoning Attack on Harness-Based Agents

arXiv:2609.13889v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Harness design has transformed the development of LLM-based agents by integrating memory, tool use, and runtime control. However, this design also in...

By Shuhuai Huang, Jingfeng Zhang, Hong Jia

llms agents multimodal safety

arXiv AI

Jun 12

A Survey on Long-Term Memory Security in LLM Agents: Attacks, Defenses, and Governance Across the Memory Lifecycle

arXiv:2604. 16548v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The emergence of writable, cross-session persistent memory in LLM agents introduces a qualitatively different threat landscape from conventional input-centric security concerns, characterized by three properties: persistence, statefulness, and propagation.

By Zehao Lin, Xixuan Hao, Renyu Fu, Shaobo Cui, Kai Chen, Chunyu Li, Zhiyu Li, Feiyu Xiong

llms agents

arXiv AI

Jun 6

Beyond Similarity: Trustworthy Memory Search for Personal AI Agents

arXiv:2606. 06054v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Personal AI agents increasingly rely on long-term memory to provide persistent personalization across sessions.

By Jiawen Zhang, Kejia Chen, Jiachen Ma, Yangfan Hu, Lipeng He, Yechao Zhang, Jian Liu, Xiaohu Yang, Tianwei Zhang, Ruoxi Jia

llms agents

arXiv AI

Jul 14

The Compliance Trap: Diagnosing How AI Agents Consume Conflicting Memory

arXiv:2607. 10608v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Memory is becoming a core component of long-horizon AI agents, allowing agents to reuse past experience when operating web browsers, software tools, and other interactive environments.

By Yixiong Chen, Xinyi Bai, Alan Yuille

agents benchmarks

Hugging Face Trending Papers

6d ago

From Attack Success to Attack Severity: Counterfactual Memory Attacks on LLM Agents

As LLM agents increasingly rely on persistent memory for long-horizon and personalized behavior, they can retain and reuse information across interactions, but this also creates a lasting channel thro...

llms agents benchmarks

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