arXiv:2607. 27080v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Memory systems allow agents to retain and reuse information from past interactions, but they can also let malicious content persist.
Summary generated by The Flow from the publisher's feed. The full article lives at arXiv AI.
arXiv:2605. 08442v5 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We discover that prompt-injection success and tool-execution success are separable safety properties: defenses that block injection do not necessarily block execution, and vice versa.
arXiv:2608. 10502v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Persistent memory lets language-model agents reuse information across sessions, but it also makes errors durable: a poisoned, stale, or misattributed record can alter reasoning, tool use, answers, and subsequent memory writes.
arXiv:2605. 08442v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Persistent memory attacks against LLM agents achieve high attack success rates against open-source models.
arXiv:2606. 04329v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Memory is a core component of AI agents, enabling them to accumulate knowledge across interactions and improve performance.
arXiv:2607. 05189v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution.
arXiv:2604. 16548v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: The emergence of writable, cross-session persistent memory in LLM agents introduces a qualitatively different threat landscape from conventional input-centric security concerns, characterized by three properties: persistence, statefulness, and propagation.