arXiv AI

Language Is a Security Surface for Agent Guards

The study investigates whether the language of a user’s instruction affects the safety verdicts of agent guards. By translating 1,220 labeled steps from an English benchmark into German, French, Turkish, Swahili, and Amharic while keeping all other data identical, the authors find that many open, small, and purpose‑built guards alter their verdicts when the instruction is translated, with larger effects for rarer languages. The impact varies with guard size, with smaller models showing greater loss of recall and larger models (e.g., Gemini 3.8 Flash) remaining largely unchanged.

arXiv AI
Aug 24

ClawSentry: A Progressive Multi-Tier Security Monitor for Safeguarding Autonomous LLM Agents

ClawSentry is an open‑source, framework‑agnostic security supervision gateway designed to protect autonomous large language model (LLM) agents from progressive risks that can arise at four points in the agent control loop: skill admission, invocation‑time intent, execution‑time effect, and post‑action consequence. It introduces a multi‑tier decision engine—deterministic L1, rule‑anchored L2, and read‑only L3—alongside a First‑Use Skill Package Review (FSPR) and an Agent Harness Protocol (AHP) that applies a single policy across multiple agent runtimes without modifying their internals. Evaluation on SkillInject and the SkillsSafety benchmark shows that ClawSentry significantly reduces contextual adversarial skill risk (ASR) while maintaining high task success rates (TSR).

By Kai Wang, Zeming Wei, BiaoJie Zeng, Chang Jin, An Wang, Xiaokun Luan, Zhixiao Lin, Jingjing Qu, Xia Hu, Xingcheng Xu
arXiv AI
Oct 9

One Word Opens the Gate: The Option-Channel Attack on Typed Decision Models as Agent Guardrails

The paper investigates typed decision models used as guardrails in agent systems, evaluating seven open‑weight models on tasks such as prompt‑injection, jailbreak, and toxic‑content screening. Accuracy for allow‑or‑block decisions ranges from 36% to 72% above chance, with models either over‑allowing or over‑blocking. The authors demonstrate that simple textual manipulations—like adding misleading names or server log lines—can dramatically increase fail‑open rates, and that all tested defenses can be bypassed, suggesting these models are unsuitable as the sole decision component.

By Seyedarmin Azizi, Erfan Baghaei Potraghloo, Massoud Pedram
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jul 7

RuBench: A Repository-Level Agentic Coding Benchmark with Natively Authored Russian Task Specifications

Developers increasingly delegate real maintenance work to product-grade coding agents, and many state tasks in their native language, in the style of a customer request rather than a curated English issue. Existing repository-level agentic benchmarks do not measure this setting: their task statements are English by design.

arXiv AI
3d ago

Global Security Blind Spots: Translation as a Safety Bypass in Low-Resource Languages

The paper investigates how large language models (LLMs) can be bypassed by translating harmful requests from English into low‑resource languages. By testing ten popular LLMs across 79 languages, the authors find that safe English completions often fail to remain safe after translation, with bypass rates between 21.9% and 44.4%. The risk is unevenly distributed across language families and varies significantly between models, making it hard to rank models by safety consistently.

By Jalil Alva, David Harper, Abigail E. Thornton, Rafael S. Villalobos Alva, Leonardo Kenji Minemura Suazo, Konstantinos Karageorgos, Diego Velazquez, Sergio A. Serrano, Marvin Vargas Flores, Aaron Schliem, Fernando F. Migone