The paper argues that AI alignment depends on a system’s ability to exhibit a coherent moral policy—stable, monotonic, decisive, and Pareto‑viable—rather than on any specific moral standard. The authors test nine large language models across varied moral scenarios and find that none maintain consistent verdicts, with surface‑form changes causing up to 99% shifts in outcomes. This indicates that current LLM agents lack the structural moral competence required for meaningful alignment.
By Arno Libert, Derck W. E. Prinzhorn, Daan R. Henselmans
The paper proposes a new method for evaluating AI accountability by analyzing the structural quality of a model’s defense for its decisions, using a four‑phase dialectical protocol based on Walton’s argumentation schemes and Govier’s criteria. Applied to nine large language models and 200 ambiguous moral-choice items, the study finds that models generally defend their reasoning well above the rubric minimum, though failures cluster on grounds and sufficiency and correlate with epistemic hedging. The protocol also reveals that models often present different argument schemes in justification than in reasoning, detects indefensible defenses, and highlights challenges in assessing retraction in AI alignment.
By Daan R. Henselmans, Derck W. E. Prinzhorn, Arno Libert
arXiv:2608. 05602v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Generative AI systems are increasingly deployed in high-stakes professional contexts, where their outputs shape what users believe, how they reason, and what they treat as settled.
By Nimisha Karnatak, Max Van Kleek, Nigel Shadbolt
arXiv:2601. 21433v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Language models are increasingly consulted on ethically consequential questions, yet the stance a model expresses may not survive a change in framing.
By Katherine Elkins, Jon Chun
arXiv:2606. 26523v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We develop a framework for interpreting AI systems as agents, drawing on the philosophical tradition of radical interpretation and the tools of mechanistic interpretability.
By Daniel A. Herrmann, Benjamin A. Levinstein
arXiv:2608. 13250v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Normative datasets are often used to train and align AI systems, but the norms they contain can function as action-guiding patterns rather than neutral moral knowledge.
By Long Hoang Nguyen, Brice Valentin Kok-Shun, Guangyu Du, Ali Sunyaev
arXiv:2607. 08017v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large-Language Models (LLMs) can be prone to flawed and unfaithful reasoning that decoding strategies like Self-Consistency (SC) fail to detect as they evaluate only final-answer agreement while ignoring the logical validity of intermediate steps.
By Riccardo Revalor, Jalees Rehman, Debjit Pal
arXiv:2608. 14522v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As AI systems make more morally loaded decisions across society, one response has been moral preference elicitation.
By Taenyun Kim, Edyta Bogucka, Daniele Quercia
arXiv:2601. 14295v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models increasingly function as artificial reasoners: they evaluate arguments, assign credibility, and express confidence.
By Michele Loi
arXiv:2606. 11635v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly.
By Menghang Zhu, Seth Lazar
The article argues that current evaluations of large language models’ moral competence focus mainly on whether outputs align with human moral values—the so‑called moral value problem—while neglecting the moral norm problem, which concerns the models’ ability to identify and apply context‑sensitive moral norms. It attributes this imbalance to the field’s reliance on descriptive ethics frameworks that emphasize value representation over normative application. The authors review existing benchmarks, highlight three gaps—lack of ground‑truth norm data, insufficient evaluation of intermediate reasoning, and limited focus on context‑relevant features—and propose a research agenda to develop formal normative representations, expert‑annotated datasets, and evaluation protocols that distinguish between value‑level and norm‑level competence.
By Aidan Kierans, Ritam Dutt, Kaley Rittichier, Shiri Dori-Hacohen, Avijit Ghosh
The paper argues that aligning large language models (LLMs) at the level of latent representations—specifically by matching their internal categorization of moral concepts to human prototype-based judgments—improves safety. Current alignment methods that focus on observable responses fail to preserve fine-grained moral categorization, leaving models vulnerable to adversarial rephrasings. By optimizing representational similarity, the authors demonstrate that LLMs can maintain more robust moral categorization and exhibit better adversarial robustness across multiple benchmarks and model sizes.
By Lingyu Li, Yan Teng, Yingchun Wang, Xia Hu