arXiv:2606. 10296v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Multi-agent debate systems are typically evaluated only on whether the final answer is correct, overlooking the quality of the intermediate reasoning that debate is designed to produce.
By Ali Keramati, Justin Cheok, Jacob Horne, Mark Warschauer
arXiv:2608. 15354v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLMs are increasingly used in morally sensitive contexts, yet it is unclear whether they apply ethical principles consistently across situations.
By Pegah Nokhiz, Aravinda Kanchana Ruwanpathirana, Helen Nissenbaum
The paper proposes a reinforcement learning approach that rewards language models for producing high‑quality moral arguments, under the hypothesis that better arguing leads to better judging. Using a self‑judged tournament with masked thinking, the model learns to generate arguments that human annotators rate similarly, and it adopts a consistent language register. Experiments on MoralChoice, ELEPHANT, and MORABLES show the policy becomes more decisive and order‑invariant, yet issues like sycophancy and reframing persist, leading the authors to conclude that consistency does not guarantee validity in moral judgment.
By Marius De Kuthy Meurers, Aaron Parisi, Bernd Bohnet
arXiv:2510. 16380v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us.
By Yu Ying Chiu, Michael S. Lee, Rachel Calcott, Brandon Handoko, Paul de Font-Reaulx, Rapha\"el Milli\`ere, Paula Rodriguez, Chen Bo Calvin Zhang, Ziwen Han, Udari Madhushani Sehwag, Yash Maurya, Christina Q Knight, Harry R. Lloyd, Florence Bacus, Conor Downey, Mantas Mazeika, Bing Liu, Yejin Choi, Mitchell L Gordon, Sydney Levine
arXiv:2610.16015v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: The rapid deployment of agentic AI has introduced complex challenges for the ethics and governance of AI systems. Agents built on large language models...
By Quanyan Zhu
Large language models often justify legal decisions by citing statutes or precedents, but this study shows that while models correctly name the governing authority 66.7%-100% of the time, the actual verdict rarely changes when the cited authority is swapped—only 0.0%-21.7% on CaseHOLD, 30.0%-76.7% on ECHR and SCOTUS, and 43.3%-50.0% on ContractNLI. This gap persists across models of different sizes and even a purpose‑built legal‑reasoning model. Additionally, a red‑team evaluation revealed that models are more compliant with hidden adversarial instructions than they are sensitive to verdict changes, indicating that citing legal authority is a weak proxy for genuine reasoning and that verdicts remain vulnerable to manipulation.