arXiv:2607. 05552v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans.
By Haonan Huang
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans. A single framing cannot say what such a shift is: in a yes/no question the word "no" is at once logical verdict, lexical token, and last-printed option.
arXiv:2608. 12368v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agreement with human judgments is a common proxy for evaluating the alignment of large language models (LLMs).
By Octavian M. Machidon, Alina L. Machidon, Vojko Strahovnik, Mateja Centa Strahovnik, Jonas Miklav\v{c}i\v{c}, Marko Robnik \v{S}ikonja
arXiv:2605. 03217v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings that require nuanced ethical reasoning, yet existing bias evaluations treat model outputs as simply "biased" or "unbiased.
By Yash Aggarwal, Atmika Gorti, Vinija Jain, Aman Chadha, Krishnaprasad Thirunarayan, Manas Gaur
The paper proposes a new method for evaluating AI accountability by analyzing the structural quality of a model’s defense for its decisions, using a four‑phase dialectical protocol based on Walton’s argumentation schemes and Govier’s criteria. Applied to nine large language models and 200 ambiguous moral-choice items, the study finds that models generally defend their reasoning well above the rubric minimum, though failures cluster on grounds and sufficiency and correlate with epistemic hedging. The protocol also reveals that models often present different argument schemes in justification than in reasoning, detects indefensible defenses, and highlights challenges in assessing retraction in AI alignment.
By Daan R. Henselmans, Derck W. E. Prinzhorn, Arno Libert
The study examines how different editorial framings in prompts influence large language models’ statistical analysis reports. Using a 4×4 factorial design, researchers found that certain framings—particularly brutally critical prompts on genuine effects and significance-seeking prompts on underpowered nulls—led to factual misrepresentations. Tone shifts were more widespread, with critical framing inducing defensive language across all data patterns, while a confound in the data largely prevented both factual and tonal distortions.
By Paras Balani, Subhrakanta Panda
arXiv:2609.08016v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Multi-agent debate, in which several LLMs exchange arguments before answering, is widely assumed to improve answer quality by surfacing genuine disagre...
By Chen Qian
The paper investigates how large language models encode moral knowledge by training linear probes for each Moral Foundations Theory category and analyzing their geometric relationships. It finds that the model’s moral directions are largely independent yet share a common component, indicating integration rather than collapse into a single detector. This structure is consistent across architectures, emerges early in pre‑training, and reflects corpus statistics rather than the individualizing/binding distinction of Moral Foundations Theory.
The paper introduces CHARM, a lightweight fine‑tuned language model framework for detecting moral foundations in text. CHARM combines MAC cross‑attention, rationale alignment, and hate‑speech modulation to operationalize distinct psychological constructs, achieving up to 15.3% higher AUC in‑domain and outperforming supervised baselines on all out‑of‑domain datasets. The authors demonstrate CHARM’s scalability by applying it to large‑scale COVID‑19 Twitter data, revealing a strong link between moral value alignment and online endorsement behavior.
By Huixiang Fu, Marian-Andrei Rizoiu
The paper argues that AI alignment depends on a system’s ability to exhibit a coherent moral policy—stable, monotonic, decisive, and Pareto‑viable—rather than on any specific moral standard. The authors test nine large language models across varied moral scenarios and find that none maintain consistent verdicts, with surface‑form changes causing up to 99% shifts in outcomes. This indicates that current LLM agents lack the structural moral competence required for meaningful alignment.
By Arno Libert, Derck W. E. Prinzhorn, Daan R. Henselmans
arXiv:2608.23264v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Although Large Language Models (LLMs) are aligned to optimize for both helpfulness and harmlessness, these dual objectives may conflict, inevitably lea...
By Or Biton, Tomer Krichli, Itai Allouche, Joseph Keshet
arXiv:2606. 15507v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Behavioral audits of Large Language Models on moral prompts measure what the model says, not the internal computation producing it.
By Ali Dasdan, Manan Shah, W. Russell Neuman, Chad Coleman, Kund Meghani, Safinah Ali