arXiv:2607. 17504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Split face recognition reduces client-side computation but exposes intermediate features to feature inversion attacks and unauthorized analysis by honest-but-curious (HBC) servers.
By Zhihan Ren, Lijun He, Xinyao Wang, Xinzhu Fu, Fan Li
arXiv:2602. 06547v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based coding agents increasingly rely on third-party extensions called skills, which bundle natural language instructions and helper scripts that execute with full user privileges.
By Yi Liu, Zhihao Chen, Yanjun Zhang, Gelei Deng, Yuekang Li, Jianting Ning, Leo Yu Zhang
Split face recognition reduces client-side computation but exposes intermediate features to feature inversion attacks and unauthorized analysis by honest-but-curious (HBC) servers. Existing privacy-preserving face recognition methods mainly aim to resist unauthorized reconstruction, typically producing features whose inversion yields visibly degraded results, which may reveal the existence of protection and motivate adaptive attacks.
arXiv:2602. 06547v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: LLM-based coding agents increasingly rely on third-party extensions called skills, which bundle natural language instructions and helper scripts that execute with full user privileges.
By Yi Liu, Zhihao Chen, Yanjun Zhang, Gelei Deng, Yuekang Li, Jianting Ning, Leo Yu Zhang
arXiv:2510. 25687v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Model inversion attacks pose an open challenge to privacy-sensitive applications that use machine learning (ML) models.
By Mallika Prabhakar, Louise Xu, Prateek Saxena
arXiv:2607. 26432v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Face anti-spoofing (FAS) is increasingly expected to provide not only bona fide/spoof decisions, but also attack semantics and image-grounded evidence for human inspection.
By Hongyang Wang, Yichen Shi, Hongrui Li, Yiru Huo, Jun Feng, Zitong Yu
arXiv:2606. 04141v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: LLM agents often place sensitive credentials in the same context window as untrusted retrieved content, creating a direct path for indirect prompt injection to induce credential exfiltration.
By Kargi Chauhan, Pratibha Revankar
arXiv:2602.02914v4 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: Privacy-preserving face recognition (PPFR) and face anonymization have different goals, but both must retain some identity-related information for...
By Wenqi Guo, Qingyun Qian, Mohamed Shehata, Shan Du
arXiv:2608.29489v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: Visual environmental risk recognition plays an important role in secure authentication, where a user's surroundings may reveal sensitive information...
By Junbin Lu, Hsiang-Wei Huang, Saesha Wadhwa, Yu Ting Hsu, Jenq-Neng Hwang
arXiv:2411. 19715v4 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We describe Forensics Adapter, an adapter network designed to transform CLIP into an effective and generalizable face forgery detector.
By Xinjie Cui, Yuezun Li, Delong Zhu, Jiaran Zhou, Junyu Dong, Siwei Lyu
The paper investigates prompt injection attacks on 14 open‑source and 3 closed‑source large language models (LLMs), introducing a new metric called Attack Success Probability (ASP) that accounts for uncertainty in model responses. It demonstrates that a simple hypnotism attack can trigger objectionable behavior in models such as StableLM2, Mistral, Openchat, and Vicuna, achieving roughly 90% ASP. The study highlights that moderately well‑known LLMs are particularly vulnerable, underscoring the importance of public awareness and effective mitigation strategies.
By Jiawen Wang, Pritha Gupta, Eyke H\"ullermeier, Xiaoxue Gao, Nancy F. Chen
arXiv:2608.29802v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Face recognition systems are increasingly deployed in security-critical applications, yet they remain vulnerable to presentation and morph attacks. Pre...
By Hatef Otroshi Shahreza, Asif Hussain Khan, Peter Lorenz, Alain Komaty, S\'ebastien Marcel