SafeTutors is a benchmark designed to evaluate both safety and pedagogical effectiveness of AI tutoring systems across mathematics, physics, and chemistry. It introduces a risk taxonomy of 11 harm dimensions and 48 sub‑risks based on learning‑science literature, focusing on issues such as answer over‑disclosure, misconception reinforcement, and loss of scaffolding. The study finds that all tested models exhibit broad harms, that larger scale does not mitigate these issues, and that multi‑turn interactions significantly increase pedagogical failures from 17.7% to 77.8%.
By Rima Hazra, Bikram Ghuku, Ilona Marchenko, Yaroslava Tokarieva, Sayan Layek, Somnath Banerjee, Julia Stoyanovich, Mykola Pechenizkiy
arXiv:2606. 02423v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) can serve as helpful assistants, yet they can equally function as harm amplifiers that enable malicious users to achieve harmful outcomes beyond their capabilities through extended interactions.
By Ruohao Guo, Wei Xu, Alan Ritter
The paper investigates how conversational safety in language models degrades over extended, adversarial interactions. By testing three instruction‑tuned models with persistent adversarial users across up to 101 turns, the study finds that safe‑response rates drop sharply from 85–100% at the first turn to 15–44% by the end. This demonstrates that strong single‑turn safety does not guarantee continued safety in long conversations.
By Parisa Salmani, Peter R. Lewis
The paper introduces a counterfactually anchored evidence attribution approach for multi‑turn large language model safety failures. It presents a new dataset of 1,762 conversations, including adversarial, benign twins, and high‑risk vocabulary variants, and trains a lightweight hierarchical model that accurately predicts safety violations and attributes them to specific user turns and token spans. The model achieves high detection performance (F1 = 0.988) and significantly reduces adversarial confidence when top‑attributed tokens are removed, while maintaining low false‑positive rates on benign conversations.
By Srinivasan Subramanian, Kazi Aminul Islam, Md. Abdullah Al Hafiz Khan
arXiv:2606. 23884v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: General-purpose large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for mental health-related conversations, yet safety safeguards remain inadequate and inconsistent across clinical conditions.
By Annika Marie Schoene, Cansu Canca, Gautham Vijay Kumar, Anson Antony
arXiv:2506.07356v3 Announce Type: replace
Abstract: While Finetuning-as-a-Service (FaaS) enables customization of Large Language Models (LLMs) using user data, this service is vulnerable to safety de...
By Seokil Ham, Yubin Choi, Yujin Yang, Seungju Cho, Younghun Kim, Changick Kim
Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content. In this work, we reveal that this advanced safety awareness inadvertently introduces a fatal vulnerability.
arXiv:2609.37837v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Vision-Language Models (VLMs) remain vulnerable to cross-modal implicit risks: visual and textual inputs that appear benign in isolation can jointly el...
By Haotian Deng, Wenbin Xing, Gang Xu, Tao He, Jinkai Zheng, Chun Li, Zheng Zhu, Ming Li
arXiv:2608.21775v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, yet they remain vulnerable to generating harmful content. From adver...
By Afshin Orojlooyjadid, Hitesh Patel
arXiv:2606. 03090v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has significantly accelerated recent research on LLM-based automatic grading (AG) systems.
By Hang Li, Fedor Filippov, Yuling Lin, Pengfei He, Kaiqi Yang, Yucheng Chu, Yingqian Cui, Hui Liu, Jiliang Tang
arXiv:2606. 05614v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) are rigorously aligned to refuse harmful requests, a process that inherently cultivates a latent capacity to evaluate and recognize unsafe content.
By Long P. Hoang, Hai V. Le, Shaoyang Xu, Wei Lu, Wenxuan Zhang
arXiv:2607. 01153v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations for language models increasingly depend on judgments about ambiguous natural-language behaviour: whether a model has followed an instruction, refused appropriately, complied with a policy, resisted an embedded command, or misreported progress in an agentic task.
By Brett Reynolds