arXiv AI By Md Jafrin Hossain, Mohammad Arif Hossain, Weiqi Liu, Nirwan Ansari

The Containment Gap: How Deployed Agentic AI Frameworks Fail Public-Facing Safety Requirements

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arXiv:2606. 12797v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic large language model systems that autonomously invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and execute multi-step plans are increasingly deployed in public-facing domains, including government services, healthcare triage, and financial advising.

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