arXiv:2606. 18021v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI systems deployed in legal workflows hallucinate at rates that aggregate metrics report at ~52%, but this average conceals where errors concentrate and in which direction they run, leaving compliance officers without an actionable signal for trustworthy deployment.
arXiv:2607. 25364v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-using agents expose structured calls but commonly attach free-form rationales.
LexAgentHallu is a new benchmark that profiles hallucinations in legal agents across multi-step interactions. It contains 3,414 instances spanning 17 legal categories and 6 task types, each annotated with a dual-layer taxonomy of 7 high-level and 27 fine-grained hallucination categories. The benchmark introduces fine-grained metrics to quantify and localize failures along an agent’s execution path, revealing patterns such as the Right-Answer-Wrong-Reason effect and clustered hallucination subclasses.
As large language models are increasingly deployed as tool-augmented legal agents, they introduce agentic hallucinations where tool-call and reasoning errors cascade into fabricated holdings and misci...
arXiv:2606. 04602v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As agents grow more capable, legal-domain LLM agents promise to turn document-heavy matters into reviewable work products -- yet reliable deployment faces three obstacles: no large-scale evidence on how today's strongest model-and-harness combinations behave on end-to-end legal matters; no agent architecture adapted to the legal vertical, only general-purpose harnesses; and, in a setting that keeps shifting with new facts, authorities, and deadlines, no mechanism for systems to learn from their own outcomes.
The paper introduces Governance-as-Code (GaC), a framework that translates the EU AI Act’s technical requirements into 43 machine‑checkable acceptance criteria across six compliance modules. GaC runs within a CI/CD pipeline, producing Article‑indexed audit evidence and providing actual Rego policy code. The authors validate GaC on two enterprise deployments, showing it reproduces manual audit findings—including three penalty‑triggering violations—while reducing audit labor by about 75%.
arXiv:2607. 17883v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Enterprises will not deploy AI agents they cannot trust, and the most-cited reason for distrust is hallucination: confident, fluent output that is simply not true.
As agents grow more capable, legal-domain LLM agents promise to turn document-heavy matters into reviewable work products -- yet reliable deployment faces three obstacles: no large-scale evidence on how today's strongest model-and-harness combinations behave on end-to-end legal matters; no agent architecture adapted to the legal vertical, only general-purpose harnesses; and, in a setting that keeps shifting with new facts, authorities, and deadlines, no mechanism for systems to learn from their own outcomes. We address each.
The paper argues that hallucinations by legal language models should be judged as failures of legal warrant rather than mere factual or citation errors. It defines claim-authority warrant as a context-sensitive relationship between a legal claim and applicable, current authority, and proposes that evaluating warrant can uncover failures missed by traditional accuracy or citation metrics. The authors outline a pilot study, benchmark specifications, and a research agenda to assess whether legal AI systems’ claims are properly licensed by law.
arXiv:2606. 04990v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM)-based agents increasingly solve complex tasks by interacting with external tools, retrieval systems, memory modules, environments, and other agents.
The paper introduces Runtime Assurance Contracts (RAC) as a formal policy framework for high‑risk AI agents, addressing the "assurance‑transition gap" by binding autonomy boundaries, component eligibility, evidence state, transition policy, human‑review capacity, and non‑compensatory gates. RAC allows soft metrics to influence routing while mandating retries, switches, escalations, deferrals, or stops when mandatory gates fail or are unknown, ensuring aggregate performance cannot alone authorize action. The authors define the contract, evidence record, permission rule, and five invariants, and evaluate RAC through deterministic failure‑injection studies, hand‑authored traces, and a prospective synthetic holdout, comparing it to score‑only and restricted protocol baselines.
The paper introduces Aegis, a runtime governance system for agentic AI that treats model outputs as action proposals and mediates them through a trusted decision layer before tool execution. Aegis evaluates proposals against active policy, resolves provenance server‑side, fails closed under uncertainty, and routes selected cases through a Senate‑style settlement process. In a sandbox evaluation across 6,300 rows, Aegis prevented all governed mock‑tool applications and risky side‑effect completions, preserving provenance and quorum evidence for all settled cases.
arXiv:2606. 14594v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI-assisted software development has moved from line-level autocomplete to agents that can plan changes, edit files, and submit pull requests with limited human supervision.