Fundamental Impossibility Results in AI Safety: Trading Off between Desiderata
The paper investigates whether safe AI systems can simultaneously satisfy multiple desiderata, such as harmlessness and helpfulness. By modeling the interaction between an AI, a defender, and an attacker as a three‑player game, the authors prove a fundamental tradeoff: advice that benefits the defender must remain public, limiting its safety guarantees. They also explore whether the AI can manipulate information to favor only the defender and discuss implications for safer AI design.
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