Agent Safety Should Be a Runtime Contract
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
arXiv:2608. 11274v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The dominant paradigm treats AI safety as a property to be instilled during model training via RLHF, DPO, or Constitutional AI.
arXiv:2606. 26057v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems.
arXiv:2606. 28347v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Contemporary AI safety spans pre-training interventions, post-training alignment, deployment-time controls, monitoring, and red-teaming.
arXiv:2605. 09045v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Agentic frameworks are the software layer through which AI agents act in the world.
The article "Math for AI safety: an invitation for mathematicians" calls for new mathematical tools to ensure AI remains understandable, controllable, and cooperative. It outlines specific mathematical fields—logic, game theory, probability, algebra, representation theory, analysis, and geometry—each paired with an open problem tailored for mathematicians without AI safety background. The piece invites researchers to contribute to designing AI that is legible, steerable, and aligned with human values.
arXiv:2606. 15024v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems where they must coordinate and agree on shared decisions.
arXiv:2608. 04289v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Long-horizon agents increasingly use persistent memory and tools to take actions with external side effects.
arXiv:2609.14422v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic Network Operations (NetOps) are an emerging paradigm promising to enable workload-aware, self-adjustable, and reliable autonomous networks. Whi...
Ensuring that AI systems are built, deployed, and used safely is critical to our mission.
The paper demonstrates that safety mechanisms for autonomous large language model agents fail to compose across iterative loops, as trajectory‑scoped monitors cannot detect attacks whose evidence is spread over multiple iterations. It introduces LoopHarness, a system that maintains a persistent, non‑decaying safety state across loops, bounding unauthorized actions with a constant that does not grow with the number of iterations. The authors provide a comprehensive evaluation protocol, including attacks that require cross‑iteration evidence, module ablations, and adaptive white‑box red‑team testing.
arXiv:2610.09294v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Rapid progress in AI agents has brought growing attention to agent safety, with extensive evaluation focused on digital environments. As agents move...
arXiv:2608. 14590v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: LLM agents increasingly perform irreversible real-world actions, including database updates, API calls, file operations, and autonomous use of tools.