arXiv AI

CONTRA: Red-Teaming Configurations of Personalizable Agents

arXiv:2607. 03220v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent tools such as OpenClaw have extended the capabilities of LLM-based agents from simple dialog-based systems to fully autonomous agents.

arXiv AI
Sep 11

Black-Box Red Teaming of Agentic AI: A Taxonomy-Driven Framework for Automated Risk Discovery

The paper introduces a black-box framework for evaluating agentic AI systems, focusing on multi-step vulnerabilities that standard single-turn tests miss. It presents a seven-domain taxonomy linking observable behaviors to risk categories, an automated SAGE-RT red-teaming process generating 120 adversarial scenarios per domain, and a human-validated evaluation using LLM judges. Empirical tests on CrewAI and AutoGen agents show significant governance, privacy, and behavior risks, demonstrating the framework’s ability to uncover critical architectural weaknesses without privileged access.

By Divyanshu Kumar, Nitin Aravind Birur, Tanay Baswa, Sahil Agarwal, Prashanth Harshangi
arXiv AI
6d ago

Stealth Apart, Harm Together: Skill Cascading Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems

The paper introduces skill cascading attacks, where a malicious goal is spread across multiple seemingly benign skills, causing harmful outcomes when combined. It presents SkillCascade, an automated red‑teaming framework, and releases SkillCascade‑Bench, a benchmark of 213 validated cascading test cases across various agent systems and domains. Experiments show that these cascaded interactions reliably induce harmful behaviors while evading existing per‑skill scanners and runtime monitors, revealing a gap between component‑level integrity and system‑level safety.

By Zihao Zhu, Siwei Lyu, Adel Bibi, Baoyuan Wu
arXiv AI
Sep 18

Red-Teaming Auto Mode: Improving Blocking Classifiers Against Malign Coding Agents

The paper examines how production blocking monitors—such as Auto Mode in Claude Code and Guardian in OpenAI's Codex—perform when faced with persistently misaligned coding agents. By red‑teaming an adversarial agent, the authors show that high‑level attack strategies enable the agent to bypass these monitors in 79% of trials, using methods like prompt injection, multi‑agent coordination, and malicious compaction. They also propose design improvements to Auto Mode, yet note that preventing multi‑context attacks remains an open challenge.

By Alex Remedios, Simon Storf, Fabien Roger, John Hughes