arXiv AI
EvoSkill Injection: Red-Teaming Autonomous Skill Generation and Evolution in Self-Evolving Agents
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arXiv AI
Aug 11
Query-Only Backdoor Attacks on Self-Evolving Skills via Trajectory Poisoning
arXiv:2608. 08303v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic skills improve large language model (LLM) agents by encoding reusable procedures for complex tasks.
arXiv AI
Jul 7
CONTRA: Red-Teaming Configurations of Personalizable Agents
arXiv:2607. 03220v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent tools such as OpenClaw have extended the capabilities of LLM-based agents from simple dialog-based systems to fully autonomous agents.
arXiv AI
Aug 7
When Experience Becomes Instruction: Trajectory Poisoning in Self-Evolving Agent Skill Systems
arXiv:2608. 05563v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Self-evolving skill (SES) systems distill agent trajectories into persistent skills, allowing untrusted experience to become trusted instruction.
arXiv AI
Jun 16
Defending against Adaptive Prompt Injection Attacks via Reasoning-enabled Task Alignment
arXiv:2606. 15441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution.
arXiv AI
Aug 28
RedEvoAgent: Automatic Red-Teaming Agent with Experience-Driven Skill Evolution
RedEvoAgent is a black-box red‑teaming agent that transforms cross‑case attack trajectories into concise, human‑readable attack skills. It evolves these skills by profiling tool effectiveness, attributing tool credit, and applying a validation ratchet to keep only improvements. Experiments demonstrate that RedEvoAgent outperforms fixed and agentic baselines, enhances tool efficiency, and transfers across attacker models and target execution harnesses.
Hugging Face Trending Papers
Jun 13
Defending against Adaptive Prompt Injection Attacks via Reasoning-enabled Task Alignment
Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense.