arXiv:2608. 08303v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic skills improve large language model (LLM) agents by encoding reusable procedures for complex tasks.
arXiv:2607. 03220v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Recent tools such as OpenClaw have extended the capabilities of LLM-based agents from simple dialog-based systems to fully autonomous agents.
arXiv:2608. 05563v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Self-evolving skill (SES) systems distill agent trajectories into persistent skills, allowing untrusted experience to become trusted instruction.
arXiv:2606. 15441v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution.
RedEvoAgent is a black-box red‑teaming agent that transforms cross‑case attack trajectories into concise, human‑readable attack skills. It evolves these skills by profiling tool effectiveness, attributing tool credit, and applying a validation ratchet to keep only improvements. Experiments demonstrate that RedEvoAgent outperforms fixed and agentic baselines, enhances tool efficiency, and transfers across attacker models and target execution harnesses.
Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks, yet recent adaptive evaluations show that these results collapse once the attacker is allowed to optimize against the deployed defense.
The paper introduces skill cascading attacks, where a malicious goal is spread across multiple seemingly benign skills, causing harmful outcomes when combined. It presents SkillCascade, an automated red‑teaming framework, and releases SkillCascade‑Bench, a benchmark of 213 validated cascading test cases across various agent systems and domains. Experiments show that these cascaded interactions reliably induce harmful behaviors while evading existing per‑skill scanners and runtime monitors, revealing a gap between component‑level integrity and system‑level safety.
The paper introduces T-MAP, a trajectory‑aware evolutionary search technique designed to red‑team large language model agents by exploiting vulnerabilities that arise during multi‑step tool execution. Unlike traditional methods that focus on harmful text, T‑MAP uses execution trajectories to generate adversarial prompts that bypass safety guardrails and achieve harmful objectives through actual tool interactions. Experiments across various Model Context Protocol environments show that T‑MAP outperforms baseline methods in attack realization rate and remains effective against advanced models such as GPT‑5.2, Gemini‑3‑Pro, Qwen3.5, and GLM‑5.
arXiv:2603. 19423v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on external tools (file operations, API calls, database transactions) to autonomously complete complex multi-step tasks.
arXiv:2602. 14211v3 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: Agent skills extend LLM agents with task-specific instructions, executable scripts, and auxiliary resources, improving reusability but creating a new supply-chain attack surface.
arXiv:2608.00677v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: AI agents operate in persistent environments where early state changes can influence decisions far into the future. Unlike conventional language-mo...
arXiv:2606. 23927v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic AI systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are rapidly evolving into autonomous decision-making systems, exposing attack vectors beyond those of traditional LLM vulnerabilities.