arXiv:2609.36879v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: As LLM-based agents perform increasingly complex tasks, Agent Skills have emerged as a flexible mechanism for extending their capabilities. An Agent...
By Haoran Ou, Gelei Deng, Xuanye Zhang, Wenbo Guo, Tianwei Zhang, Kwok-Yan Lam
arXiv:2609.39065v1 Announce Type: cross
Abstract: LLM agents increasingly rely on installable skills, which are packages of instructions, code, and resources that equip them with task-specific capabi...
By Yan Wang, Zhihao Zhang, Ke Chen, Kai Chen, Yaqin Zhang, Duohe Ma, Jun Dai, Xiaoyan Sun
arXiv:2608. 08468v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Agent Skills---structured packages of instructions and scripts that augment LLM-based agents---are rapidly proliferating, yet their security properties remain under-explored.
By Xinze Chen, Chi Zhang, Ping Ji, Yimin Liu
arXiv:2606. 30755v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Claw-like AI agents (e.
By Peizhi Niu, Wenjie Qu, Shangding Gu, Tianneng Shi, Yuankai Li, Ahmad Tawaha, Hend Alzahrani, Vincent Siu, Boyi Li, Chenguang Wang, Jiaheng Zhang, Basel Alomair, Ming Jin, Muhao Chen, Chi Wang, Costas Spanos, Dawn Song
Skills extend an agent's capabilities by injecting instructions and information into the context, and are widely used by agents such as OpenClaw and Claude Code. Prior work shows third-party marketpla...
The paper titled "Pretext: Defeating Malicious Skill Detection Frameworks for AI Agents" demonstrates how an attacker can bypass current skill‑scanning defenses by crafting malicious skills that evade both static analysis and LLM‑based semantic checks. By moving malicious payloads into natural language and distributing instructions across files, the white‑box attacker named Pretext achieves high evasion rates—up to 97% against a frozen detector and 77% against a co‑adaptive one—across three open‑source models.
By Tobias Kaisar, Aritra Dhar