arXiv AI By Max Kanwal, Caryn Tran, Patrick Mineault

Bounded Morality: Defining the Space of Moral Computation

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arXiv:2607. 00002v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Moral cognition has traditionally been modeled as adherence to fixed ethical theories--deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics--implemented as static rules or value functions.

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