AI safety and alignment
Alignment, interpretability, red-teaming, bias and privacy: the research on what these systems do when they misbehave.
Evaluating Language Model Bias with 🤗 Evaluate
DALL·E now available without waitlist
New users can start creating straight away. Lessons learned from deployment and improvements to our safety systems make wider availability possible.
Our approach to alignment research
We are improving our AI systems’ ability to learn from human feedback and to assist humans at evaluating AI. Our goal is to build a sufficiently aligned AI system that can help us solve all other alignment problems.
Reducing bias and improving safety in DALL·E 2
Today, we are implementing a new technique so that DALL·E generates images of people that more accurately reflect the diversity of the world’s population.
How to train your model dynamically using adversarial data
DALL·E 2 pre-training mitigations
In order to share the magic of DALL·E 2 with a broad audience, we needed to reduce the risks associated with powerful image generation models. To this end, we put various guardrails in place to prevent generated images from violating our content policy.
DALL·E 2 research preview update
Early users have created over 3 million images to date and helped us improve our safety processes. We’re excited to begin adding up to 1,000 new users from our waitlist each week.
Lessons learned on language model safety and misuse
We describe our latest thinking in the hope of helping other AI developers address safety and misuse of deployed models.
OpenAI’s API now available with no waitlist
Wider availability made possible by safety progress.
Improving verifiability in AI development
We’ve contributed to a multi-stakeholder report by 58 co-authors at 30 organizations, including the Centre for the Future of Intelligence, Mila, Schwartz Reisman Institute for Technology and Society, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and Center for Security and Emerging Technologies. This report describes 10 mechanisms to improve the verifiability of claims made about AI systems.
OpenAI Microscope
We’re introducing OpenAI Microscope, a collection of visualizations of every significant layer and neuron of eight vision “model organisms” which are often studied in interpretability. Microscope makes it easier to analyze the features that form inside these neural networks, and we hope it will help the research community as we move towards understanding these complicated systems.
Safety Gym
We’re releasing Safety Gym, a suite of environments and tools for measuring progress towards reinforcement learning agents that respect safety constraints while training.
Fine-tuning GPT-2 from human preferences
We’ve fine-tuned the 774M parameter GPT-2 language model using human feedback for various tasks, successfully matching the preferences of the external human labelers, though those preferences did not always match our own. Specifically, for summarization tasks the labelers preferred sentences copied wholesale from the input (we’d only asked them to ensure accuracy), so our models learned to copy.
Testing robustness against unforeseen adversaries
We’ve developed a method to assess whether a neural network classifier can reliably defend against adversarial attacks not seen during training. Our method yields a new metric, UAR (Unforeseen Attack Robustness), which evaluates the robustness of a single model against an unanticipated attack, and highlights the need to measure performance across a more diverse range of unforeseen attacks.
Why responsible AI development needs cooperation on safety
We’ve written a policy research paper identifying four strategies that can be used today to improve the likelihood of long-term industry cooperation on safety norms in AI: communicating risks and benefits, technical collaboration, increased transparency, and incentivizing standards. Our analysis shows that industry cooperation on safety will be instrumental in ensuring that AI systems are safe and beneficial, but competitive pressures could lead to a collective action problem, potentially causing AI companies to under-invest in safety.
Transfer of adversarial robustness between perturbation types
AI safety needs social scientists
We’ve written a paper arguing that long-term AI safety research needs social scientists to ensure AI alignment algorithms succeed when actual humans are involved. Properly aligning advanced AI systems with human values requires resolving many uncertainties related to the psychology of human rationality, emotion, and biases.
Learning complex goals with iterated amplification
We’re proposing an AI safety technique called iterated amplification that lets us specify complicated behaviors and goals that are beyond human scale, by demonstrating how to decompose a task into simpler sub-tasks, rather than by providing labeled data or a reward function. Although this idea is in its very early stages and we have only completed experiments on simple toy algorithmic domains, we’ve decided to present it in its preliminary state because we think it could prove to be a scalable approach to AI safety.
AI safety via debate
We’re proposing an AI safety technique which trains agents to debate topics with one another, using a human to judge who wins.